Lost Stories / Grief & Mourning

The Language of Loss

When Grief Has Not Yet Found Its Words

Blane Brazier, MA, LPC

We can know exactly what we have lost and still have no idea what we are grieving. Someone dies, a relationship ends, a familiar life comes apart, and we find ourselves attempting to explain something that refuses to become particularly clear. We know what happened. We can describe the circumstances, recall the conversations, and tell the story with remarkable accuracy. Yet something about the experience remains strangely difficult to say. We might call it sadness, although sadness hardly seems sufficient. We might speak of loneliness, anger, guilt, or regret. These words are familiar enough, but sometimes they seem to describe everything except what has happened to us. Grief has an unusual place among the experiences that bring people into psychotherapy because it is one of the few forms of psychological suffering for which we already seem to have an explanation. When someone dies, we expect those who loved them to grieve. Their distress is understandable, their tears require little interpretation, and their difficulty returning to ordinary life hardly seems mysterious. We know why they are suffering. Or at least we think we do.

Knowing the circumstances of a loss, however, tells us remarkably little about the person who has suffered it. Two people can lose someone under nearly identical circumstances and find themselves living through entirely different experiences. One may be overcome by longing while another becomes strangely preoccupied with practical arrangements. Someone may feel unbearable sadness over the death of a parent with whom they had a close relationship, while another may discover that the death of an estranged parent has disturbed them far more profoundly than they anticipated. The literature of grief support has developed a remarkably rich language for describing these differences. Much of this work begins with a phenomenological interest in how loss is experienced, attending to the circumstances of the death, the relationship that has been interrupted, and the social world in which the griever must continue living. We might distinguish a traumatic loss from an anticipated death, recognize secondary losses that accompany bereavement, or speak of anticipatory, prolonged, or disenfranchised grief. These distinctions matter because they give language to suffering that might otherwise remain misunderstood. The facts of the loss may be easily established, but what has been lost is not always so obvious.

Judith Butler's work on grievability introduces another dimension to this problem. Butler asks us to consider how social and political arrangements influence whose lives are recognized as worthy of mourning. Consider someone in the queer community whose partner dies after a long relationship. Their grief may be every bit as devastating as that of a surviving spouse, yet their place among the mourners may be less secure. Perhaps the deceased's family never acknowledged the relationship, or the surviving partner discovers that their shared life has become strangely invisible in the arrangements surrounding the funeral. They may be introduced as a close friend while others receive the public recognition of family. The difference does not tell us whose grief is more painful. It asks why one relationship can be readily recognized as worthy of mourning while another must struggle to establish its place. Grief does not occur apart from the social world. We inherit a language that already carries expectations about whose relationships matter, what kinds of loss deserve recognition, and how suffering ought to be expressed.

Robert Neimeyer's essay, The Language of Loss: Grief Therapy as a Process of Meaning Reconstruction, offers an important development of this question. Neimeyer understands mourning as more than an emotional response to a recognizable event. A loss can disturb the meanings through which a person understands their life, requiring them to renegotiate the story they have come to tell about themselves and their relationships. The griever does not simply discover the appropriate words for an experience whose significance has already been established. Language and narrative participate in how that significance is formed. The death of a spouse, for example, may disrupt not only companionship but the familiar understanding of oneself as a husband or wife, the expectations through which a shared future had been imagined, and the ordinary assumptions that made life recognizable. Neimeyer's approach considers how meaning can be reconstructed through the continued telling, remembering, and reconsideration of these relationships. Mourning becomes a process through which the person attempts to make sense of a world that can no longer be inhabited in quite the same way.

Darian Leader approaches this difficulty from another direction in The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia, and Depression. Leader is concerned that the contemporary language of depression has come to absorb experiences that earlier psychoanalytic traditions attempted to distinguish. A person may report sadness, exhaustion, diminished appetite, difficulty sleeping, or a loss of interest in ordinary pleasures, and these symptoms may reasonably invite clinical attention. Yet the description of a depressive condition does not necessarily tell us what has happened to the person's relationship with someone they have lost. Leader returns to Freud's distinction between mourning and melancholia to ask whether we have become so familiar with describing suffering through its symptoms that we have lost interest in the particular work of mourning. Someone may experience considerable relief from their symptoms while remaining unable to recognize what has been lost or what the loss has disturbed within their life. This does not make the relief unimportant. It means that the treatment of depressive symptoms and the work of mourning cannot always be understood as the same undertaking.

Leader's account is especially interesting because mourning involves more than recognizing that another person has died. We may also have to mourn the place we occupied in their life and the image of ourselves that became possible through their recognition. A daughter may grieve her father while continuing to live as though his approval remains the final measure of her accomplishments. A widow may miss her husband while discovering that the person she knew herself to be within their marriage has also disappeared. The loss is not simply that someone is no longer present, but that the relationship through which certain wishes, memories, and images of ourselves acquired their meaning has been interrupted. Leader considers how these different dimensions of loss must find some form of representation if mourning is to become possible. The work is not simply to remember the person more accurately or replace them with another attachment. It involves recognizing an absence that cannot be undone while discovering how the relationship continues to occupy a place within one's psychic life.

What makes Leader's argument particularly valuable is his insistence that mourning is not an entirely private psychological accomplishment. Funerals, rituals, memorials, artistic representations, and the participation of others provide ways of giving absence a place in the world. Public expressions of mourning may allow people to encounter losses that extend far beyond the particular death being commemorated. A community gathering around one person's death can become an occasion for people to recognize something of their own losses. The ritual does not necessarily resolve anyone's suffering, but it provides a shared language through which something that would otherwise remain terribly private can acquire recognition. This is especially important when we consider the social conditions of mourning described by Butler. The absence of public recognition may deprive a griever not only of support, but of an available place from which the loss can be acknowledged and spoken about. Leader helps us see why mourning requires more than an individual's willingness to express emotion. Our relationships do not exist independently of the social arrangements through which they have become meaningful.

This understanding also complicates what we mean when we encourage someone to move on. Mourning does not necessarily require that we relinquish the importance of a relationship or cease remembering the person who has died. Rather, the relationship must become possible in a different way, one that acknowledges an absence without requiring that the lost person continue to occupy precisely the same position. A man may continue addressing his deceased wife in ordinary conversation, remembering what she would have thought about an event or imagining how she might have responded to something amusing. There is nothing inherently troubling about these experiences. Yet we might become interested if he finds himself unable to make even minor decisions without seeking her imagined permission, or if every new relationship becomes organized around an obligation to remain the husband she once knew. The difficulty may not lie in continuing to love the person who has died, but in the authority that the relationship continues to exercise over what the surviving person feels permitted to become.

During my years working as a hospice chaplain, I became increasingly interested in how difficult it could be to distinguish emotional suffering from the rest of a person's life. Someone approaching death might describe physical pain that intensified whenever a particular family member visited. Another might report feeling relatively comfortable while expressing an unbearable fear of what would happen to their spouse after they were gone. A family could appear remarkably composed until an apparently insignificant disagreement about funeral arrangements brought years of resentment into the room. Cicely Saunders, whose work helped establish the modern hospice movement, developed the concept of total pain to describe suffering that cannot be understood through physical symptoms alone. Pain may involve psychological, social, and spiritual dimensions that participate in the person's experience of illness and dying. A body does not suffer independently of the life being lived within it. Grief presents a similar difficulty because a loss may disturb the arrangements through which someone has come to recognize themselves and their place in the world.

A woman may spend years caring for a husband whose illness has gradually taken away much of the man she remembers marrying. By the time he dies, she has already mourned his independence, their sexual relationship, their shared plans, and the ordinary pleasures of companionship. Grief support might reasonably recognize anticipatory grief and the secondary losses that accompany years of caregiving. Neimeyer's approach may help her reconsider the meanings through which she understands the future that now awaits her. Leader's work raises another question about how her husband's absence can become acknowledged within a life that had been organized around his needs. But when she enters therapy, something else may become important. She discovers that she cannot enjoy an evening with friends without feeling guilty. She apologizes whenever she describes relief that her husband is no longer suffering. She becomes unusually distressed when her adult children suggest that she should begin doing something for herself. We might become interested in what it has meant for her to be needed, what she imagines pleasure might say about her love, and why becoming someone who is no longer responsible for another person's survival feels so terribly difficult. These questions suggest that the loss has entered a life in which dependence, responsibility, love, and resentment already occupied complicated places.

Donnel Stern's concept of unformulated experience helps us consider how suffering can be consciously felt without its meaning having become available for thought. Grief may be approached as an affect, something experienced emotionally and bodily, while its significance within the person's psychic life remains less apparent. The griever may recognize their sadness, anger, loneliness, or anxiety without understanding why a particular feeling has become so difficult to bear. Stern directs our attention toward experiences that have been lived without becoming sufficiently formulated for reflection. This does not require us to imagine that the affect itself is unconscious. Rather, what the person feels may have associations and implications that have not yet found expression. Analytic treatment becomes interested in how these meanings are linked to the person's relationships, identifications, and symptoms, including those occasions when painful feelings are repeatedly enacted in relationships rather than considered through speech.

How a therapist theorizes the self will inevitably influence what they listen for and what they imagine treatment might accomplish. A loss may disturb the familiar ways a person recognizes themselves, contains difficult emotions, and maintains relationships. Stabilization may involve helping the griever bear these feelings without repeatedly expressing them through withdrawal, resentment, demands for reassurance, or conflicts with those upon whom they depend. But analytic listening also asks how the person understands what has happened and how that understanding has been organized within their sense of self. We attend to what is emphasized, what has been left out, and what slips unintentionally into the narrative through a contradiction, an unusual word, or a remark quickly corrected. Even the most familiar story may have been carefully edited, sometimes deliberately and sometimes without the griever's awareness, to preserve an image of the relationship or of themselves that has become difficult to question.

Analytic listening attends not only to what the griever says, but to how they speak of themselves, about themselves, to themselves, for themselves, and sometimes as though speaking from somewhere outside themselves. Equally important is how they relate to the Other, whose place may be experienced as outside them, above them in judgment, beneath them in need, or within them as a familiar voice of expectation or reproach. The place of the Other preserves the transindividual character of the unconscious, where desire, language, and recognition cannot be contained within the boundaries of a single mind. A griever may continue defending themselves before a parent who has died, seeking permission from someone whose approval was never secure, or speaking as though an absent loved one still determines what they are permitted to want. These positions may open onto early relationships with primary caregivers, through which the person first encountered the desires and demands of others and began forming the images through which they recognize themselves. Yet the Other is not reducible to those caregivers. Its place persists through the language, expectations, and relationships that continue organizing the subject's experience beyond any particular person.

A woman speaks of her deceased mother as someone who never understood her. She has said this many times, and the statement seems entirely reasonable. Then, while remembering an argument about a family holiday, she unexpectedly recalls how carefully her mother prepared the food she loved as a child. The memory does not cancel the disappointment. Her mother may indeed have misunderstood her in ways that caused considerable suffering, but the small recollection disturbs the certainty with which she had organized the relationship. Something else becomes possible to think. The analytic listener need not decide what the memory proves. Its importance may lie in the fact that the daughter has begun remembering someone who no longer fits quite so easily into the account she had been telling. What initially appeared to be a familiar story of disappointment may become a more complicated account of loving someone whose tenderness could be expressed in some circumstances while remaining painfully unavailable in others. Her grief may become linked to her difficulty trusting affection, accepting care, or believing that someone could love her without requiring her to become a different kind of person.

These moments can reveal something of the neurotic division between lived experience and the imago through which the person recognizes themselves. The griever may speak as the devoted spouse while expressing resentment toward the person they have lost, or describe themselves as independent while repeatedly seeking recognition from someone whose approval has never felt secure. Analytic listening does not attempt to eliminate these contradictions by supplying a more coherent identity. It allows the griever to become interested in the different positions from which they speak and the place of the Other to whom their words remain addressed. In this respect, the work may differ from the reconstruction of a life narrative. The griever may not need to find a better story about who they are, but an opportunity to hear themselves speaking beyond the story they have come to believe. What was previously enacted through symptoms or familiar conflicts may begin to find expression in language, allowing the person to recognize something of their division without requiring that it disappear.

There is something curious about the word missing. We use it to describe someone who is absent, but also something that has not been found. A missing person is not necessarily the same as a person who has died. The word preserves a question about where someone has gone, what remains unknown, and whether what has disappeared might somehow return. Grief often contains this peculiar uncertainty even when the facts of the loss are entirely clear. The person has died. We know they will not return. Yet their absence continues to appear in familiar places. We hear their voice in something we are about to say, discover their gestures in our own movements, or find ourselves imagining what they would have thought about an event they will never witness. The person who is missing may remain remarkably present, although something else may be missing as well. There may be an understanding we have never reached, a question we were unable to ask, or a feeling we could not permit ourselves to acknowledge while the person was alive. We may discover that what troubles us is not only the loss of another person but the loss of the person we imagined ourselves becoming in relation to them.

The language of mourning is rarely as orderly as the explanations we give for it. A person may return to the same memory repeatedly, telling it almost word for word, until an apparently insignificant detail changes something about the account. They may describe a loved one with extraordinary tenderness and become irritated when someone else remembers that person differently. They may insist that they have accepted the death while continuing to organize their life around an imagined conversation that will never take place. Such contradictions are not necessarily obstacles to mourning. They may be the very places where something about the relationship begins to find expression. Neimeyer helps us consider how language participates in reconstructing a world disturbed by loss, while Leader reminds us that mourning also requires finding a place for absence within a world shared with others. Analytic listening becomes interested in how the words themselves may reveal expectations, contradictions, and desires that continue organizing the griever's relationship to someone who is no longer present.

The work of listening does not require that every loss become understandable, nor does it require that every experience be explained through an unconscious conflict. Some absences remain, and there are experiences for which language may never feel particularly sufficient. But there is a difference between knowing what kind of loss someone has suffered, helping them reconstruct a meaningful relationship to what has happened, and listening for how the loss has become implicated in the organization of their psychic life. These are not necessarily competing undertakings, and each may become important at different moments in the griever's experience. Grief may begin with the loss of someone we love, but it does not always end with learning how to live without them. Sometimes it opens an encounter with parts of our own lives that have never found their words, allowing us to recognize how the relationships we have lost continue speaking through the lives we are trying to live.

Books on This Subject

Further reading on mourning, the recognition of loss, and the relationships through which grief acquires meaning.

The New Black by Darian Leader

The New Black: Mourning, Melancholia, and Depression

Darian Leader

Leader revisits the distinction between mourning and melancholia, questioning the tendency to understand loss primarily through the language of depression. He explores the importance of ritual, symbolic expression, and shared recognition in the work of mourning.

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Disenfranchised Grief edited by Kenneth J. Doka

Disenfranchised Grief: Recognizing Hidden Sorrow

Kenneth J. Doka, Editor

Doka examines losses that receive little recognition or support within the surrounding community. The collection considers how social expectations can leave grievers without an acknowledged place from which to mourn.

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Precarious Life by Judith Butler

Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence

Judith Butler

Butler considers how vulnerability, loss, and mourning are shaped by social recognition. Her work asks whose lives are publicly understood as grievable and how the absence of recognition can complicate mourning.

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Notes & References

  1. Neimeyer, R. A. (2001). The language of loss: Grief therapy as a process of meaning reconstruction. In R. A. Neimeyer (Ed.), Meaning Reconstruction and the Experience of Loss (pp. 261โ€“292). American Psychological Association.
  2. Saunders, C. (1978). The philosophy of terminal care. In C. Saunders (Ed.), The Management of Terminal Malignant Disease.