Lost Stories / Psychoanalytic Essays

The Transference of Everyday Life

A Problem Within the Symbolic

Blane Brazier, MA, LPC

I. The Faces of Transference

From Freud’s Consulting Room to Everyday Life

Transference has become one of the most familiar concepts in psychotherapy and, perhaps for that very reason, one of the most easily misunderstood. Many contemporary therapists are taught to recognize it through the feelings a patient develops toward the clinician, particularly when those feelings appear to repeat an earlier relationship. A patient becomes angry with the therapist as they once became angry with a parent, seeks the therapist's approval as they sought a teacher's recognition, or fears abandonment when the therapist announces an absence. These observations are not mistaken, but they offer a considerably narrower account than the one Freud developed. Transference concerns more than the displacement of feelings from one person onto another. It concerns how the subject encounters another person through an unconscious history of desire, identification, and recognition, and how that encounter becomes organized around a question the subject may have spent a lifetime attempting to answer: What does the Other want from me?

Freud's The Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1901) offers an interesting point of departure. The title itself invites us to consider how the unconscious discourse takes a path through suffering, the psyche making its way through a life whose meanings are not entirely available to consciousness. The unconscious treads a path unseen by the naked eye, although its passage becomes apparent in the peculiar disturbances of ordinary experience. The repressed returns in our mis-speaking, mishearing, miswriting, and forgetting, sometimes introducing into speech precisely what the speaker had intended to leave unsaid. Freud's investigations of forgotten names, slips of the tongue, and apparently accidental mistakes suggest that the unconscious is not simply a hidden place beneath conscious experience. Its activity can be encountered within the very language through which we attempt to make ourselves understood. What appears to be an interruption of meaning may become another way through which meaning finds expression, following a path that neither the speaker nor the listener could have anticipated.

This offers a different way of approaching transference. If the unconscious finds expression through the ordinary disturbances of language, might something similar occur in the relationships through which we recognize ourselves and others? We do not simply speak to the people before us. We speak through histories of desire, identification, and recognition that have already given certain words, gestures, and silences their significance. A question may be heard as an accusation, an ordinary disappointment as abandonment, or another person's desire as a demand that we become somebody other than ourselves. The transference of everyday life concerns this movement of unconscious meaning through our relationships, where what appears to belong entirely to the present may also carry the unresolved questions of another time.

Freud had already encountered the problem of transference in his early work on hysteria, where an affect or wish could become attached to the physician through what he described as a false connection. In Studies on Hysteria, written with Josef Breuer, he began to recognize how something belonging to an earlier association could become attached to the physician within the treatment itself. By the time he published The Dynamics of Transference in 1912, he had developed a more elaborate account of the patterns through which a person's erotic life becomes organized. These patterns, shaped by inherited dispositions and early experiences, establish expectations through which the subject approaches subsequent relationships. Freud described how the physician becomes incorporated into one of these existing patterns, or stereotypical plates, through which the patient repeatedly organizes love and desire.1 The significance of this formulation is easily overlooked. Freud was not simply describing a patient who mistakes the therapist for a parent. He was describing how unconscious patterns of desire acquire new objects and how the present becomes organized through expectations that precede the encounter.

The physician's authority was particularly important to Freud's clinical experience. His patients encountered a neurologist whose professional standing, medical knowledge, and position within the treatment already carried considerable symbolic significance. The physician might represent an admired authority, a disappointed parent, a demanding teacher, or someone whose approval appeared capable of settling a question the patient had never been able to answer. These figures need not appear as recognizable memories. They may become apparent in how the patient speaks, what they withhold, the meanings they attribute to the analyst's interventions, and the particular forms of satisfaction or suffering that emerge within the relationship. Transference was therefore not an accidental disturbance of treatment. It became one of the conditions through which the unconscious could be encountered.

One of the more curious features of Freud's clinical technique is the couch. It has become so closely associated with psychoanalysis that it can seem like a ceremonial object, an inherited piece of furniture whose significance has been preserved largely through tradition. Freud's own explanation was considerably more practical. In On Beginning the Treatment (1913), he acknowledged that the arrangement was inherited from his earlier use of hypnosis and admitted a personal reason for maintaining it: he found the prospect of being watched by patients throughout an entire working day intolerable.2 The explanation is almost comically ordinary. The founder of psychoanalysis did not particularly enjoy having people stare at him for eight hours. Freud also recognized a technical advantage in sitting outside the patient's field of vision. His facial expressions could influence the patient's associations, and the arrangement reduced the extent to which the patient might continually monitor the physician's visible reactions. What had begun as a practical arrangement became implicated in a technique that privileged speech and association over the ordinary exchange of social cues.

The arrangement raises an interesting question about what happens when the patient can no longer see the analyst's face. The face does not simply disappear from the encounter. It becomes something the patient must imagine. The patient hears a change in tone, a hesitation, an unexpected question, or a silence that seems to last longer than usual. They wonder whether the analyst is disappointed, interested, amused, bored, or perhaps even angry. A question about a particular relationship may seem to imply that the analyst considers it important, while an interpretation may be experienced as an invitation to consider something unfamiliar or as an accusation that the patient has been refusing to recognize an obvious truth. The patient begins to decipher the analyst, attending not only to what has been said but to what the analyst's speech might reveal about their desire.

The analyst's actual behavior remains consequential. An impatient tone may genuinely communicate impatience, and a poorly timed interpretation may close down an association. Psychoanalysis does not require us to pretend that everything the patient perceives is imaginary. What interests us is how the perception acquires its particular significance for this subject. Why does one patient experience a question as curiosity while another experiences the same question as interrogation? Why does silence provide relief for one person and become evidence of abandonment for another? Why might a patient become convinced that the analyst disapproves of them when no such judgment has been expressed? These questions concern more than feelings. They concern the faces through which the analyst becomes recognizable and the desire the patient imagines those faces to represent.

Projection is one way this can occur. A person may attribute to another an aggression, envy, or judgment they find difficult to recognize in themselves. Transference, however, is not reducible to projection. The therapist begins to embody not simply a person from the patient's past, but something of that person's desire. The question that has organized so many of the patient's relationships now enters the treatment: What does the Other want from me? What must I become to please them, to remain desirable, and ultimately to guarantee that I am wanted? The analyst's questions, silences, expressions of curiosity, and interpretations begin to acquire significance within this familiar uncertainty. Why did the analyst ask about that particular relationship? Why did they remain silent when I spoke about my anger? Why did they seem interested in something I had considered unimportant? The patient may begin to imagine that the analyst has discovered what others have always wanted from them, or perhaps what has prevented others from wanting them in the first place. This must be what the Other wants from me. Perhaps this is why I have never been wanted enough. The analyst comes to occupy a position within the patient's unconscious attempt to decipher the Other's desire, and the patient may begin speaking, defending, pleasing, resisting, or withholding in relation to what they imagine that desire to be. What emerges is more than the repetition of an earlier relationship. It is the reactivation of the question through which the subject has attempted to become somebody for another, a question that may have organized their love relationships long before they entered treatment.

The patient may consequently begin speaking as though someone other than the particular analyst were present. They may become defensive, apologetic, seductive, argumentative, or unusually childlike, answering a question that was never asked or defending themselves against an accusation that was never made. These moments are not simply examples of the patient confusing the analyst with another person. The analyst has come to occupy a position from which the patient expects something to be wanted, demanded, withheld, or granted. The particular analyst remains present, and their conduct continues to matter, but the encounter has acquired meanings that exceed the immediate relationship. Freud's couch did not eliminate these meanings. It altered the conditions under which they might emerge, making the analyst's visible face less available while leaving the patient to encounter the many faces and desires that could be attributed to it.

Transferential phenomena appear throughout ordinary life. A colleague makes a passing remark and we hear criticism. A supervisor asks for clarification and we experience humiliation. A spouse forgets something ordinary and we feel an old conviction that we have never mattered to anyone. A stranger's expression seems to communicate contempt, although we know almost nothing about them. Sometimes these perceptions are accurate. People can be judgmental, dismissive, prejudiced, or cruel, and the actual conduct of others must not be explained away through an appeal to unconscious fantasy. On other occasions, the significance attributed to an encounter seems to exceed what has occurred. A person may become caught in a conflict with someone who has come to represent an authority from their past, or may experience a present disappointment through a history of longing that the other person cannot possibly know. What appears to be a disagreement about the present may also be an attempt to settle something that has never been resolved.

Prejudice offers another example of how an encounter may become organized through meanings that precede the person being encountered. We may approach another already convinced that we know what they think, what they value, or what they intend. The person becomes an instance of a category before we have encountered them as a subject. Prejudice has social, historical, and political dimensions that cannot be reduced to individual projection, although psychoanalysis may investigate the unconscious satisfactions that attach to these judgments. A person may preserve an image of themselves by locating an unwanted quality in someone else, or may discover that their certainty about another person's intentions has protected them from considering something uncomfortable about their own desire. The difficulty is not simply that we misunderstand others. Our misunderstandings may become necessary to the ways we understand ourselves.

We do not meet people as isolated individuals whose meanings are created entirely within the present encounter. We meet them through names, titles, family positions, ideals, social expectations, and histories of recognition. A person becomes a father, daughter, employer, rival, patient, stranger, or friend, and each position carries meanings that exceed the individual who occupies it. The symbolic relationships through which we recognize one another are indispensable to social life, although they also create opportunities for misrecognition. We may become so invested in another person's position that we struggle to encounter anything about them that exceeds it. A father may be known only through his failure to recognize his child, while the child may become so identified with being neglected that the father's other relationships and desires remain difficult to imagine. Sometimes an encounter interrupts this familiar organization and makes another relationship possible.

II. A Man by Another Name

An Encounter in Mourning

In my work as a therapist, I met with the adult son of a man living in a memory care facility whose dementia had substantially altered his ability to recognize the people around him. Our meetings began in what might ordinarily be described as a pre-bereavement context. His father was still alive, but the son was already mourning a relationship that seemed to be disappearing before him. What troubled him most was that his father had forgotten his name. The loss was difficult enough, but something more peculiar had occurred. His father had begun calling him by another man's name. The son recognized the name from somewhere, although he could not place it, and he found himself increasingly preoccupied with what it might mean. His father could no longer remember the name of his own son but apparently retained the name of someone else. It was difficult for him not to experience this as a judgment about their relationship.

The son spoke about earlier experiences of neglect, occasions when he had felt that his father's work and other responsibilities had taken precedence over him. Now, at the end of his father's life, the old feeling had returned with a particular cruelty. Even his name seemed to have been displaced. We could have approached the matter as a familiar feature of dementia, since memory impairment frequently disrupts recognition and the substitution of one name for another need not carry any particular unconscious intention. There would have been good reason to acknowledge this, but doing so would not have exhausted the son's experience. His suffering concerned the meaning the name had acquired for him. Whatever neurological process had produced the substitution, he was now living with the painful possibility that someone else had occupied a more significant place in his father's life.

My earlier work as a hospice chaplain had taught me to be curious about the relationships through which people experience loss. I had spent years listening to families describe complicated marriages, unfinished conversations, estrangements, reconciliations, and the ordinary disappointments that become especially painful as someone approaches death. I was interested in the particularity of these relationships and in the ways grief could become entangled with histories of love, resentment, obligation, and regret. That curiosity was important, and I would not want to dismiss the work it made possible. Still, I had begun to sense something lacking in an approach that understood mourning primarily through the exploration of personal relationships and the emotions attached to them. The griever could describe a relationship with remarkable clarity, recognize the contradictions within it, and even arrive at a more generous understanding of the person they had lost, while something of their longing remained untouched.

Had I encountered this son earlier in my work, I might have understood his distress principally as an expression of anticipatory grief complicated by childhood neglect. I would likely have been interested in the history of his relationship with his father, the emotional significance of being forgotten, and the painful experience of watching dementia alter someone he loved. Such an inquiry would not have been mistaken. It might have offered considerable comfort and helped him find words for experiences that had remained difficult to articulate. But I suspect I would have been more inclined to explain the substituted name through the father's illness and return to the son's feelings about the loss. I would have been less prepared to consider how the name itself had entered the son's unconscious organization of desire, or how his suffering had become attached to the question of what he had been for his father.

The difference concerns more than the depth of an emotional exploration. The son's grief was not simply an expression of sadness about losing his father's recognition. The substituted name had become involved in a question that had organized much of his life: Had he ever been a son worth remembering? His father was no longer merely the person whose memory was failing. He occupied a symbolic position from which the son had long sought some guarantee of his own goodness. The name of another man appeared to confirm the failure of that recognition, and the son's anger became entangled with a longing that could not be satisfied by explaining the neurological circumstances of his father's illness.

Rather than deciding what the name meant, we began to speak about the associations it produced, the history it seemed to awaken, and the questions the son found himself asking. The name did not have to be treated as an intentional communication from his father to become meaningful within the son's grief. Its significance was already apparent in what the son was doing with it. Through the father's failure of recognition, the son had encountered an old question about his own desirability, and the name had become a signifier around which that question could be articulated. Over several weeks, he became curious about something he had initially experienced only as a wound. Eventually, he asked a family member whether the name was familiar, without explaining that it was the name his father had begun using for him.

He learned that it belonged to a businessman with whom his father had once enjoyed a close relationship. The discovery raised more questions than it answered. Who was this man? What had he meant to his father? Why might his name have survived when the son's own name seemed inaccessible? The son began asking around and learned that the two men had known one another through business and had spent considerable time together. Eventually, he located the man and arranged to meet him for coffee.

When he later described the meeting, he began with the sound of the coffee grinder. “With the sound of grinding coffee beans, I was grinding my teeth,” he told me. He had arrived angry, although he was not entirely sure whom he was angry with. Perhaps he resented this man for possessing a place in his father's memory that he believed should have belonged to him. Perhaps he was angry with his father for leaving him with one final experience of exclusion. I was curious about his anger, and he had become curious about it too. “Well, it didn't last long,” he said, “because he had a lot to say about their relationship.”

The businessman explained that he and the father had once been competitors. Their businesses sometimes placed them on opposing sides of negotiations, but the rivalry had gradually developed into a friendship. They discovered that they enjoyed one another's company and began playing golf together. The golf course became a place where they could discuss the frustrations of business, their families, and the ordinary disappointments of life. They did not need much competition in their professional dealings, the man explained, because they often managed to work out their quibbles by the eighteenth hole. They traded victories, each taking a hole after the other. “Your dad was a driver,” he said. “He could hit the ball what seemed like three hundred yards from the tee. Now, his short game was a different story. But his ball always seemed to have an advantage over mine.”

The son laughed when he repeated this. Something about the description had stayed with him. His father had been remarkable over the long distance, but not particularly good at the short game. He wondered whether there was something about his father's memory in that image. His father could no longer recognize what was immediately before him, although something from a distant part of his life remained accessible. The association was the son's, and there was no need to establish whether it accurately described the neurological character of his father's illness. It had become a way for him to think about the strange relationship between distance and recognition. The businessman continued, “Now, I had the short game. I could putt him off the green. We often joked that I should use my putter at the tee box. And one day I actually did. And, as you could guess, I birdied the hole.” The two men had laughed about it for years.

Then the conversation changed. The businessman recalled that one day the father had failed to appear for their regular golf game. He called to give him a hard time about missing their appointment, expecting the familiar exchange of insults and jokes. Instead, the father became angry. He insisted that no game had been arranged and accused his friend of making plans without telling him. The businessman felt misunderstood and became defensive himself. Their conversation deteriorated into an argument, and in his frustration, he made a joke about the father developing “old-timers' disease.” The father hung up and afterward would not return his friend's calls. The businessman eventually learned that the father had begun showing signs of dementia and was living in a care facility. By then, their relationship had been interrupted for some time. He felt embarrassed by their last conversation and uncertain whether it was appropriate to contact the family. He had never found a way to repair what had happened.

“And then you called,” he told the son. He paused before adding, “Today is very special to me.”

The son had gone to the coffee shop expecting to meet a man who had somehow taken his place in his father's memory. Instead, he encountered someone who was also grieving his father. The businessman had lost a friend, and their last exchange had left him with a painful memory of misunderstanding. The son had imagined that this man's name represented his own displacement. Now the name belonged to a relationship that had contained affection, rivalry, admiration, anger, and an unfinished goodbye. When the son returned to our conversations, he asked whether his father might have been trying to say goodbye to an old friend. I could not answer that question. There was no way to know whether the father had intended anything of the sort. His dementia had changed his capacity for recognition, and we could not recover the meaning of the substitution with certainty. But the question itself represented an important movement. The son was no longer asking only why his father had forgotten him. He had begun wondering who his father had been to someone else.

The son began to consider whether his role as caregiver could change. He had been visiting his father as a son who longed to be recognized, and each failure of recognition had reopened the wound. Perhaps he could visit as someone offering companionship without requiring his father to identify him correctly. Could he become a friend to his father? Could he sit with him, listen to him, share an ordinary moment, or even allow himself to be addressed by another man's name without experiencing the encounter only as evidence of his own displacement? Could he be someone to whom his father might say goodbye, and would that be enough? These questions did not resolve his grief or establish that his father had secretly been asking for forgiveness or attempting to recover a lost friendship through his son. They allowed the son to consider a different position in relation to his father's desire.

III. The Longing Within Mourning

Transference, Recognition, and the Possibilities of Analysis

The son's experience brought into sharper focus a difficulty that had interested me throughout my work with grievers. A person may understand the history of a relationship, recognize its contradictions, and speak openly about love and resentment without finding much relief from the wish that the person they have lost might finally tell them who they had been to them. His father had forgotten his name, but the injury was not confined to the loss of recognition. He wondered whether he had ever been a son worth remembering. The question belonged to their relationship, although it also seemed to exceed the circumstances of his father's dementia. His longing was not simply for the return of a familiar father. He wanted something from his father that may never have been available, even before the illness: an assurance that he had been sufficiently loved, that he had mattered, that he had been good enough. The substituted name seemed to confirm his fear that another man had occupied the place he had wanted for himself.

Freud's account of transference offers an interesting way of approaching such longing. The unconscious does not simply preserve earlier relationships as memories that might eventually be recovered and understood. Something of those relationships continues to find expression in the present, including the questions through which the subject has attempted to become desirable to another. The griever may know quite well that the person they have lost can no longer answer them, while continuing to organize their suffering around the possibility of receiving that answer. Their longing may become attached to an object, a memory, an unfinished conversation, or, in this case, a name that seems to belong to someone else. The significance of these associations cannot always be established in advance, and their meaning may change as the griever begins to speak about them.

The connection to The Psychopathology of Everyday Life is particularly interesting here. Freud's investigations of forgotten names invite us to consider how an apparently ordinary disturbance may become implicated in unconscious meaning, although the distinction between his examples and this father's dementia is essential. We cannot treat the father's substitution of names as evidence of a repressed wish or an intentional communication. His illness provides no reliable access to such a conclusion. What interests us instead is the son's encounter with the name and the associations through which it becomes significant to him. The father's forgetting remains uncertain, while the son's response to that forgetting opens an unexpected path through his own history of longing. The unconscious significance of the encounter does not depend upon establishing the hidden intention of the person who made the mistake.

What interested me about the son's discovery was not that we had uncovered the hidden meaning of his father's mistake. We had not. His curiosity had taken him somewhere neither of us anticipated. He encountered another man who was also grieving his father, and the name that had initially represented his own displacement became associated with a friendship, an argument, and an unfinished goodbye. His father became someone he had not entirely known, and the son's question about whether he had been a good enough son began to give way to another possibility. Could he become a friend to his father, someone who might offer companionship without requiring recognition in return? Whether that would be enough remained uncertain, although the uncertainty no longer seemed to foreclose the relationship.

Lacan's distinction between the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real gives us another way to consider what occurred. The son's identification with being the forgotten child had become organized through a history of recognition and neglect. The substituted name initially appeared to confirm that familiar position. His father's inability to recognize him was real in the ordinary sense of the word, but it would be a mistake to identify the neurological condition itself with Lacan's Real. What interests us is the limit encountered within the son's established understanding of their relationship. Something had happened that could not be entirely accommodated by the meanings through which he had known his father or himself. The name opened an uncertainty, and that uncertainty made other associations possible.3

The symbolic positions through which we recognize one another do not simply disappear when their meanings become unstable. The son remained his father's son, and his father remained the man whose recognition he had long desired. Their history of neglect was not undone by the discovery of a friendship. What changed was the apparent necessity of understanding their relationship exclusively through that history. His father had desires and relationships that exceeded his role as father, and the son could begin wondering about a place within that life that did not depend entirely upon being recognized as good. The paternal imago had not been replaced by a more accurate or benevolent image. Its claim to explain the whole relationship had become less certain.

This is one of the more interesting possibilities opened by thinking about mourning through transference. We may discover that the person being mourned occupies several positions within the griever's unconscious life, not all of which are available through an account of the relationship itself. A widow may mourn her husband while continuing to wonder whether she was ever the woman he wanted. An adult daughter may grieve a mother whose approval she no longer needs in any practical sense, although the question of what would have pleased her continues to organize important decisions. Such questions are not necessarily resolved by a more complete understanding of the deceased. They may become more interesting when the griever begins to recognize how the lost person's desire has remained implicated in their own.

Transference is often described as the return of an earlier relationship within the therapeutic encounter. Freud's discovery, however, invites us to consider something broader about how unconscious life enters our relationships. The people we encounter may become important not simply because they resemble someone from our past, but because they seem to occupy a position from which something about our own desire might finally be answered. A question, a silence, an expression of curiosity, or an unexpected name may acquire significance beyond the circumstances in which it appears. We find ourselves addressing questions to others that neither they nor we may fully understand.

The analyst is not exempt from this process. The patient's curiosity about what the analyst wants may become as consequential as the analyst's curiosity about the patient. An interpretation may be heard as a judgment, a silence as disappointment, or an ordinary question as evidence that the analyst has discovered something the patient has failed to understand about themselves. The analyst's actual conduct matters, but the meanings that emerge may exceed what either person intended. Freud's couch offers a curious illustration of this problem. The absence of the analyst's visible face does not eliminate the desire the patient imagines behind it. It may instead make that desire more available to the patient's associations.

I have become increasingly interested in what happens when we approach the griever's speech with this possibility in mind. The work may begin with the familiar circumstances of loss, although an apparently incidental detail can become more interesting than the explanation we expected to find. A name, a forgotten appointment, an old argument, or a peculiar memory may open questions that have remained unspoken within the relationship. Sometimes these questions concern the person who has died. At other times, they concern the person the griever has been trying to become for someone whose recognition could never provide the certainty they wanted.

The son's father could not tell him why he had used another man's name. The businessman could not repair the friendship he had lost, and the son could not recover the recognition he had wanted from his father. Their meeting did not resolve these losses. It made possible an encounter neither had anticipated, one in which the son discovered something about his father's life that had remained outside his understanding. He began wondering whether he might relate to his father differently, not because he had finally learned what his father wanted, but because he no longer seemed quite so certain that he already knew.

Perhaps this is one of the possibilities that psychoanalysis offers mourning. The longing for recognition may remain, but the question through which that longing has been organized can become available for further thought. The griever may begin to encounter the lost person beyond the familiar imago, while discovering something of their own desire in the uncertainty that follows. Neither the history nor the loss disappears. What opens is the possibility of another relationship to what remains unknown, including the person we have lost and the person we have imagined ourselves to be for them.

Notes

1. Sigmund Freud, “The Dynamics of Transference” (1912), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 12, translated and edited by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1958), 97–108, especially 99–100. Freud describes the formation of patterns through which erotic life becomes organized and the physician's incorporation into these patterns. The account of the analyst occupying a position within the patient's question about the Other's desire draws upon Lacan's subsequent development of transference rather than Freud's terminology alone.

2. Sigmund Freud, “On Beginning the Treatment (Further Recommendations on the Technique of Psycho-Analysis I)” (1913), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 12, 121–144, especially 133–134. Freud explains the couch's origins in hypnotic treatment, his discomfort at being watched throughout the working day, and his concern that the analyst's facial expressions might influence the patient's associations.

3. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXII: RSI (1974–1975), and The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII: The Sinthome (1975–1976). Lacan's later topological work develops the interrelation of the Real, Symbolic, and Imaginary. The formulation of therapeutic change through a different subjective position within the symbolic order is the interpretive application developed in this essay rather than a direct quotation from Lacan.

References

Breuer, Josef, and Sigmund Freud. Studies on Hysteria. 1895. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 2. London: Hogarth Press, 1955.

Freud, Sigmund. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. 1901. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 6. London: Hogarth Press, 1960.

Freud, Sigmund. “The Dynamics of Transference.” 1912. In The Standard Edition, vol. 12, 97–108. London: Hogarth Press, 1958.

Freud, Sigmund. “On Beginning the Treatment.” 1913. In The Standard Edition, vol. 12, 121–144. London: Hogarth Press, 1958.

Freud, Sigmund. “Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through.” 1914. In The Standard Edition, vol. 12, 145–156. London: Hogarth Press, 1958.

Freud, Sigmund. “Mourning and Melancholia.” 1917. In The Standard Edition, vol. 14, 237–258. London: Hogarth Press, 1957.

Lacan, Jacques. “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis.” 1953. In Écrits, translated by Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006.

Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIII: Transference. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated by Bruce Fink. Cambridge: Polity, 2015.

Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated by Alan Sheridan. New York: W. W. Norton, 1978.

Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXII: RSI. 1974–1975. Seminar delivered in Paris.

Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XXIII: The Sinthome. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated by A. R. Price. Cambridge: Polity, 2016.

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