Lost Stories / Psychoanalytic Essays

The Unstoried

Creative Conjuncting and the Ambivalence of Affect

Blane Brazier, MA, LPC

I. The Story Already Told

The Familiar and the Unformulated

People often arrive in psychotherapy with stories they know quite well. They can describe what happened, who was involved, and how they have come to understand the difficulties that continue to trouble them. Some have spent years in treatment and have acquired a remarkable familiarity with the language of psychology. They speak about attachment, trauma, boundaries, emotional regulation, and the patterns they recognize in their relationships. Others arrive with considerably less interest in psychological explanations. They know only that something has become difficult, that an old problem has returned, or that a relationship they once enjoyed has become strangely exhausting. In either case, the patient has already begun telling a story. The question is what else might become possible in the telling.

Consider a woman who becomes increasingly irritated whenever her husband asks for help. She knows that she grew up attending to her mother's emotional needs and has often understood her resentment through that experience. She remembers being the dependable daughter, the one who could be counted on when everyone else had become overwhelmed. Her husband is not her mother, and she recognizes that he has needs of his own. Nevertheless, his requests sometimes awaken an irritation that seems disproportionate to the occasion. She may explain that she has spent too much of her life taking care of other people. The explanation is understandable. It may also be something she has considered many times before. We could ask whether she resents being needed, whether she enjoys being indispensable, or whether she has difficulty allowing herself to depend upon someone else. Any of these questions might become interesting. But we do not yet know what she will find worth talking about.

She may begin describing the way her husband asks for help. Something about his tone reminds her of her mother's voice. Or she may recall a particular afternoon when she wanted her mother to help with a school project and was told that she was old enough to manage on her own. She has not thought about that afternoon in years. It might seem to confirm the familiar account of having been required to become independent too early. Then again, she remembers that her mother eventually sat beside her and helped finish the project. She recalls the smell of the kitchen, the paper scattered across the table, and how much she enjoyed having her mother's attention. The memory introduces something that does not fit quite so easily into the story she has been telling. She may become interested in that difference, or the memory may lead somewhere else entirely.

Freud's investigations of free association suggest that the movement of unconscious thought cannot be anticipated simply by knowing the subject under discussion. An apparently incidental remark may introduce another memory, a fantasy, an objection, or a peculiar turn of phrase that neither patient nor analyst had expected.1 The importance of an association is not always apparent when it first appears. Sometimes its significance emerges later, after the patient has returned to it in another context. At other times, an association remains no more than an interesting interruption. There is no particular reason to insist that everything said must become evidence of an unconscious explanation.

The familiar story can be useful. It may give the patient a way to organize experiences that once seemed confusing or impossible to describe. A person who has struggled to understand a difficult childhood may find considerable relief in recognizing that their feelings have a history. Someone who has spent years believing that every conflict is entirely their fault may begin considering how another person's behavior contributed to what occurred. These discoveries can matter a great deal. Yet the story may also continue to develop. A patient can recognize an experience as neglectful and remember moments of tenderness. They can understand a relationship as damaging and remain interested in what made it desirable. They can know that someone disappointed them and continue wondering about that person's life. None of these additional thoughts requires the earlier understanding to be abandoned.

Freud's distinction between remembering, repeating, and working through offers a useful point of reference. In his 1914 paper, he describes how aspects of an earlier experience may find expression in the present rather than become available simply as recollection.2 The patient's account of the past and their experience of the present may develop alongside one another without becoming identical. A person may understand why they have come to expect disappointment and still find themselves surprised by the intensity of their response to an ordinary encounter. They may discover something about their own participation in a familiar conflict, or they may begin recognizing that the present situation differs from what they had anticipated. The work does not always proceed by correcting an earlier understanding. Sometimes it proceeds because another detail becomes interesting.

There is also something curious about the way people tell stories about themselves. We rarely begin at the beginning, and even when we do, the beginning tends to change. An experience that once seemed incidental can become important years later. Someone may remember a parent's anger long before remembering their own. A patient may spend several sessions describing an unhappy marriage and then begin talking about the pleasure of being married, as though the subject had only just occurred to them. The two accounts need not be reconciled immediately. Both may belong to the relationship, and neither may exhaust it. What becomes available through speaking is not necessarily a more complete story, but another possibility for thinking about one that remains unfinished.

I have become interested in calling this movement creative conjuncting. The expression concerns the modest possibility introduced by the word and. A patient speaks about resentment, and another feeling enters the conversation. A familiar explanation is followed by an unexpected memory. An apparently settled account becomes available for another association. The conjunction does not tell us what the next thought ought to be. It makes room for the thought to arrive. There may be an important distinction between adding something to a story and requiring that the story become more complicated. The former leaves the patient free to follow an association. The latter can become another demand placed upon the patient to discover what the clinician believes is missing.

II. Loving to Hate

The Vicissitudes of Ambivalence

There is a peculiar pleasure in finally becoming angry with someone. A woman who has spent years accommodating a demanding friend reaches a point where she can no longer tolerate the arrangement. She begins telling her husband about the many occasions when she felt taken advantage of, the invitations she accepted out of obligation, and the conversations in which she listened patiently while her own difficulties went unnoticed. She has told some of these stories before, but something about them now seems especially irritating. She remembers an evening when her friend called during dinner and spent nearly an hour complaining about a colleague. The woman had been looking forward to spending time with her husband. Instead, she found herself offering reassurance while her dinner grew cold.

As she speaks, she becomes animated. Her husband notices that she seems to enjoy describing the friend's outrageous behavior, and the observation makes her laugh. She admits that she has been looking forward to telling him about their latest disagreement. There is something satisfying about the complaint. She can say what she thinks without having to worry about whether her friend will become upset. She enjoys having someone listen to her, and she enjoys the occasional exaggeration that makes her husband laugh. Her resentment remains genuine. So does the pleasure she takes in speaking about it. We might become curious about the relationship between these experiences, although the patient may already be interested in something else.

Freud's account of the vicissitudes of the drives provides one way of considering the complicated relationship between love and hate. In his 1915 essay, he examines how love and hate develop through different relationships to pleasure, displeasure, and the object.3 Melanie Klein subsequently gave ambivalence a central place in her understanding of object relations, particularly in her account of the difficulty of loving and hating the same person.4 These theoretical developments invite us to consider the coexistence of feelings that ordinary language often treats as mutually exclusive. Yet the coexistence itself need not become the conclusion of every clinical inquiry. A patient may be interested in her anger without experiencing any affection for the person who has disappointed her. Another may discover that affection has survived a relationship she no longer wishes to continue. The particular arrangement matters more than demonstrating the presence of a theoretical principle.

What interests me is the possibility that a person may love to hate someone, or hate to love them, and find that neither expression adequately describes what they are experiencing. A daughter may resent the demands of caring for her aging mother while enjoying the intimacy of their daily routines. She may complain about having to prepare dinner and then become unexpectedly sad when her mother no longer wants to eat. A husband may be irritated by his wife's habit of correcting him in public and find himself missing the same habit when she is away. A widow may remember her husband's generosity and then recall how much she disliked his tendency to offer advice when she wanted only to complain. The movement between these experiences may be playful, painful, embarrassing, affectionate, or altogether ordinary. We need not decide that one feeling is more authentic than another.

There is an important difference between becoming interested in ambivalence and expecting the patient to demonstrate it. A clinician who has become convinced that love and hate are always intertwined may begin listening for evidence that confirms the conviction. The patient speaks about anger, and the clinician wonders where the love has gone. The patient speaks about affection, and the clinician begins looking for aggression. The theory can become an arrangement in which every experience must contain its opposite. Such interpretations may occasionally open an interesting conversation, but they may also leave the patient feeling that the clinician has already decided what their feelings mean.

Consider someone who describes a parent as cruel. The clinician may be tempted to inquire about the patient's affection for the parent, especially when the patient seems unable to remember anything good about the relationship. There may be a history of love, dependency, admiration, or longing that has not yet become available for discussion. There may also be experiences of cruelty that the patient has spent years trying to name without being believed. An invitation to consider affection can become difficult to distinguish from another person's insistence that the parent could not have been entirely bad. The patient's response may tell us something about the intervention, the relationship, or the history that has made such questions difficult. It does not automatically establish that the patient is defending against ambivalence.

The analytic relationship introduces its own possibilities for misunderstanding. A patient may experience the clinician's curiosity as skepticism. The clinician may genuinely have been skeptical. Another patient may welcome the same question because it gives them permission to speak about feelings they had been reluctant to mention. A third may find the question uninteresting and continue with the story they were telling. The meanings of these encounters develop within the particular relationship. Countertransference, identification, and the analyst's own expectations may become important, but they do not provide a privileged position from which the patient's experience can be settled.

The imago introduces another dimension to these difficulties. We come to recognize ourselves through relationships in which certain qualities, roles, and expectations acquire significance. A person may have been admired for being dependable, praised for being agreeable, or recognized as the one who could manage difficult situations. These identifications can become important ways of participating in relationships. They may also become subjects of curiosity when a person finds themselves behaving differently from what they had expected. The dependable daughter may enjoy an afternoon in which someone else takes responsibility. The agreeable friend may discover that she likes disagreeing. Or she may continue enjoying the familiar role while wondering why it has recently become more difficult. The imago does not need to be treated as a false identity waiting to be dissolved. It can become one of the many ways a person has learned to recognize themselves and others.

Ambivalence is interesting partly because it allows us to remain uncertain about the relationship between feelings. Anger may be pleasurable, but not always. Love may involve resentment, although it need not. A person can be relieved by a death and devastated by the loss. Someone may enjoy caring for another while wishing for a different life. These experiences can coexist without requiring us to decide what they ultimately reveal about the person. The question is less whether the patient has arrived at a sufficiently complex emotional understanding than what becomes possible when they begin talking about the experiences themselves.

And there may be something else. The woman who has been complaining about her demanding friend remembers that the two of them once spent an entire afternoon laughing about a disastrous vacation. She had forgotten how funny her friend could be. She begins telling the story, and for several minutes the complaint disappears. When she finishes, she returns to the disagreement that brought her into the conversation. She is still angry. She may decide that the friendship has become too difficult to continue. She may call her friend the next day. Or she may spend another session talking about the vacation. The memory does not settle the matter, but it has given them something more to talk about.

III. And Then?

Creative Conjuncting and the Possibility of Further Association

One of the difficulties of writing about psychoanalytic technique is that a description of something interesting can quickly become an instruction about what the clinician should do. We notice that a question has opened an unexpected association, and soon we are tempted to turn the question into a method. The next patient arrives with a familiar complaint, and we begin looking for an opportunity to introduce the same intervention. What had been a moment of curiosity becomes a procedure with an anticipated result. There is nothing especially surprising about this development. Clinicians want to understand what has been useful in their work, and they naturally hope to make such experiences available to other patients. Still, something can be lost when the analyst becomes more interested in reproducing an intervention than in hearing what the patient has to say.

Creative conjuncting is my provisional name for a way of thinking about the associative possibilities that emerge when one experience is allowed to exist alongside another. The conjunction and interests me because it can introduce an addition without requiring a correction. A patient may describe an argument with a spouse and remember a disagreement with a parent. They may begin talking about a childhood disappointment and become interested in a recent experience of pleasure. They may describe feeling lonely and then recall a time when solitude was especially enjoyable. The second association does not necessarily explain the first. It may complicate it, extend it, interrupt it, or lead to a subject that neither person had considered.

We can imagine a patient who begins a session by saying that nothing particularly interesting happened during the week. The clinician asks about the weekend, and the patient mentions having visited a bookstore. They had gone looking for a gift but spent most of the afternoon wandering through the shelves. They remember finding a book they had loved as a child. The cover was different from the one they remembered, and they were disappointed. Then they begin describing the old cover, the room where they used to read, and a neighbor who occasionally brought them books. The conversation has traveled a considerable distance from the original report that nothing interesting happened. There may be a relationship between the patient's disappointment and the memory of the neighbor. There may be something important about the changed cover. Or the patient may simply enjoy remembering the books. The conversation can continue without our having to decide.

Freud's technical recommendations concerning evenly suspended attention remain relevant to this possibility. He cautioned against selecting material according to the analyst's expectations, since doing so risks finding only what the analyst already knows.5 The observation is especially interesting when considered alongside the patient's freedom to associate. Free association does not mean that every utterance must be followed by an interpretation. It invites a kind of listening in which the importance of a detail may remain uncertain. The analyst may be curious about something the patient has said, while the patient may find another detail more compelling. Their interests may converge, diverge, or become part of the conversation itself.

There are occasions when an analyst's question becomes an interruption rather than an opening. A patient may be approaching something difficult and find that the clinician has introduced a connection too quickly. They may feel pressured to agree, or they may begin explaining why the interpretation is mistaken. The disagreement can be worth considering, but it need not be understood as resistance to an unconscious truth. The clinician may have misunderstood the patient. The question may have arrived at an unfortunate moment. The patient may have been interested in something else. Even when an intervention appears theoretically persuasive, its usefulness remains a question that develops through the patient's response.

Something similar occurs when the patient begins to imagine what the analyst wants from them. They may arrive with carefully prepared insights, hoping to demonstrate that the treatment has been productive. They may apologize for talking about ordinary events or for returning to a subject they have discussed many times. They may become concerned that the clinician is disappointed by their lack of progress. These moments can introduce questions about the analytic relationship, including the possibility that the analyst has contributed to the expectation. A therapist who repeatedly praises insight may unintentionally encourage the patient to produce more of it. A clinician who seems especially interested in childhood memories may find that the patient begins searching for childhood material. What emerges in the treatment cannot always be separated from the conditions under which it is invited.

The conjunction and can be useful here, although it need not be spoken aloud. A patient may feel disappointed in the treatment and remain interested in continuing. They may enjoy the clinician's attention and resent the dependence that develops. They may find an interpretation useful and dislike the way it was offered. They may have no particular wish to explore these feelings at all. The clinician can remain curious without requiring the patient to adopt an analytic account of the encounter. There is room for the analyst to have made a mistake, for the patient to disagree, and for the conversation to continue in a direction neither expected.

We might also consider what happens when the patient has nothing more to say. Silence can be uncomfortable, especially when both people have become accustomed to treating each session as an opportunity for discovery. The clinician may begin searching for a question that will restore the conversation. Yet silence can belong to many different experiences. Someone may be thinking, feeling overwhelmed, enjoying a moment of quiet, or wondering whether the analyst expects them to speak. The patient may be bored. The analyst may be bored as well. These possibilities do not all require the same response. At times the silence becomes interesting. At others, the conversation resumes with something quite ordinary.

Creative conjuncting does not depend upon a particular kind of patient, an ideal emotional state, or a predetermined clinical achievement. It is not an argument that every difficulty should be approached through further complexity. There are circumstances in which a patient needs practical assistance, clarification, continuity, or an immediate response to danger. There are times when an interpretation is useful and others when it is not. The possibilities of analytic work cannot be reduced to the clinician's ability to generate interesting associations. What matters here is a more limited observation: an experience may become available for further thought when it is not required to confirm an explanation already in place.

The term unstoried interests me for this reason. It does not necessarily refer to an experience that has never been narrated or to a forgotten memory awaiting recovery. It concerns what remains possible within a life that has already been described in many different ways. We tell stories about ourselves because they help us recognize where we have been, what has happened, and who we imagine ourselves to be. These stories can be moving, funny, protective, painful, and remarkably useful. They can also change. An old memory may acquire a different significance. A familiar relationship may become interesting for an unexpected reason. Something once considered unimportant may find a place in the conversation, while another concern gradually loses its urgency.

There is no reason to assume that every new association brings us closer to a final truth. The patient may return to the same story tomorrow and tell it much as they did before. They may find that a new understanding has made little difference to the way they feel. They may discover an unfamiliar pleasure in something they once disliked, or begin questioning an attachment that had seemed entirely satisfactory. Some conversations change the direction of treatment. Others are simply conversations worth having. Their significance may become apparent much later, or remain uncertain.

The unstoried need not be something waiting to be uncovered. It can emerge in the course of speaking, when neither person is entirely certain where the conversation is going. A patient returns to a familiar grievance and discovers another grievance beside it, an affection that seems strangely out of place, or a memory that has little apparent connection to either. There may be something pleasurable about the complaint, something exhausting about the affection, and something curious about the fact that this particular memory has appeared just now. We need not decide what belongs together. The patient may be interested in one association and indifferent to another. What matters is that the conversation has somewhere else to go.

Creative conjuncting describes a way of remaining available to these possibilities. The and does not complete the patient's thought. It leaves the thought open. It does not insist that opposing feelings be reconciled, that an unconscious meaning be discovered, or that a familiar story be abandoned. It permits another thought to arrive alongside the first, without requiring either to explain the other. The clinician may have misunderstood. The patient might have something entirely different in mind. Or the conversation may be moving somewhere neither anticipated.

And then?

Or simply something more to say.

Notes

1. Sigmund Freud, "The Psychopathology of Everyday Life" (1901), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 6 (London: Hogarth Press, 1960). Freud's investigations of slips, forgetting, and apparently incidental associations provide one point of departure for considering the unexpected movement of unconscious meaning in ordinary speech.

2. Sigmund Freud, "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through" (1914), in The Standard Edition, vol. 12, 145–156. The distinction between recollection and repetition is extended here to the relationship between familiar explanations and the ongoing possibilities of association.

3. Sigmund Freud, "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" (1915), in The Standard Edition, vol. 14, 109–140. Freud's discussion of love and hate provides a foundation for considering ambivalence without assuming that every clinical expression of one feeling necessarily conceals its opposite.

4. Melanie Klein, "Love, Guilt and Reparation" (1937), in Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945. Klein's account of ambivalence and the relationship between loving and aggressive feelings is relevant to the present discussion. The emphasis on allowing associations to develop without a predetermined interpretation is the author's own clinical formulation.

5. Sigmund Freud, "Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-Analysis" (1912), in The Standard Edition, vol. 12, 109–120. Freud's account of evenly suspended attention informs the discussion of the analyst's expectations and the possibility of listening without selecting material solely according to an established theory. Creative conjuncting is the author's proposed term rather than a technique named by Freud.

References

Freud, Sigmund. The Psychopathology of Everyday Life. 1901. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 6. London: Hogarth Press, 1960.

Freud, Sigmund. "Recommendations to Physicians Practising Psycho-Analysis." 1912. In The Standard Edition, vol. 12, 109–120. London: Hogarth Press, 1958.

Freud, Sigmund. "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through." 1914. In The Standard Edition, vol. 12, 145–156. London: Hogarth Press, 1958.

Freud, Sigmund. "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes." 1915. In The Standard Edition, vol. 14, 109–140. London: Hogarth Press, 1957.

Klein, Melanie. "Love, Guilt and Reparation." 1937. In Love, Guilt and Reparation and Other Works 1921–1945. London: Hogarth Press, 1975.

Bion, W. R. Learning from Experience. London: Heinemann, 1962.

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