Lost Stories / Psychoanalytic Essays
The Feeling of Being Felt
The Other's Desire and the Vicissitudes of the Imago
I. What Do You Want from Me?
Recognition, Desire, and the Formation of the Imago
There is something peculiar about being looked at by another person. We can become aware of their attention before we know what it means. A glance across a crowded room may feel affectionate, disapproving, curious, or altogether indifferent. Someone listens while we speak, and we begin wondering what they are thinking. Their expression changes, and we notice ourselves changing in response. We may become more animated, more cautious, or unusually eager to explain ourselves. The encounter can be quite ordinary. Yet the experience of being seen introduces a question that has accompanied us through much of our lives: what does this person see when they look at me?
We are not always asking the question consciously. A child who has learned that a parent enjoys hearing about school may arrive home eager to describe the day's accomplishments. Another may hesitate before mentioning a disappointment, anticipating a reaction that has become familiar. The parent may have expectations that are plainly expressed, but the child also encounters something less certain. A change in the parent's voice, an expression of interest, a silence at an unexpected moment, or a conversation overheard from another room can acquire significance. The child begins forming ideas about what matters to the people upon whom they depend. These ideas may be mistaken, perceptive, exaggerated, or revised many times. They become part of the child's developing experience of being somebody for another.
Freud's account of identification offers one way to consider how these encounters become involved in the formation of the ego. In The Ego and the Id, he describes the ego as bearing the history of abandoned object-cathexes and identifications, while the ego ideal introduces a complicated relationship to parental authority and expectation.1 The person we imagine ourselves to be cannot be understood entirely apart from the people through whom we have come to recognize ourselves. Their words, gestures, ideals, and disappointments may continue to matter long after the relationships have changed. We carry something of these encounters into subsequent relationships, although the meanings we give them are never simply copies of what another person intended.
Consider a woman whose father was especially interested in her academic accomplishments. She remembers him attending school events, helping with difficult assignments, and speaking proudly about her achievements. She also remembers feeling disappointed when he seemed less interested in other parts of her life. As an adult, she becomes successful in a profession that requires considerable intellectual ability. She enjoys her work and has good reasons to be proud of what she has accomplished. Yet she sometimes wonders whether her enthusiasm for the profession belongs entirely to her. She remembers how pleased her father had been when she announced her career plans. She may begin wondering what he would have thought had she chosen something else. The question need not diminish her enjoyment of her work. It introduces another possibility for thinking about the place her father's desire has occupied in her own.
Lacan's account of the mirror stage gives this problem another dimension. The child encounters an image of bodily unity at a time when their experience of movement and coordination remains comparatively unsettled. Recognition of the image involves an identification, but the unity offered by the image does not coincide neatly with the child's lived experience.2 The ego emerges through this complicated relationship to an image that is both one's own and encountered outside oneself. The imago becomes important not simply because it represents another person, but because identification with an image offers a way of becoming recognizable to oneself.
The distinction between the ego and the subject becomes especially consequential here. A person may describe themselves through a coherent collection of qualities, preferences, achievements, and memories. They may know themselves as dependable, ambitious, generous, independent, or difficult to please. These descriptions are not necessarily false. They can be accurate and useful ways of participating in social life. Yet something of desire may remain unsettled within them. The dependable person may wonder why they are so irritated when someone else takes responsibility. The independent person may long to be cared for and dislike that longing. The ambitious person may discover that success has not settled the question of what they wanted from the achievement.
Lacan's distinction between need, demand, and desire allows us to consider why the recognition offered by another person can become so compelling. A request may concern something practical, but the exchange can acquire a significance that exceeds the requested object. The child asks for help and may also be interested in the parent's willingness to help. A spouse asks whether the other has time to talk, and the answer may become implicated in a question about affection or importance. The distinction is not that ordinary requests secretly mean something else. Rather, speech takes place within relationships where the meaning of a request cannot always be separated from the desire attributed to the person receiving it.3
What do you want from me? The question can become especially interesting when no clear demand has been made. A patient may enter psychotherapy wondering what kind of person the clinician expects them to become. They may assume that the therapist wants them to be less angry, more independent, more emotionally expressive, or better able to maintain relationships. These expectations may arise from earlier experiences of authority and recognition. They may also reflect something the clinician has actually communicated. A therapist who consistently responds with enthusiasm to particular discoveries can unintentionally encourage the patient to produce more of them. The patient's account of the analyst's desire is therefore not simply a fantasy to be interpreted. It may be a perceptive response to something happening between them.
There is a further complication. The person whose desire we are trying to understand may not know what they want. Parents can have conflicting hopes for their children. A father may encourage independence while becoming disappointed when his daughter no longer seeks his advice. A mother may celebrate her son's accomplishments and miss the years when he depended upon her. A clinician may wish for a patient to become more autonomous and feel unexpectedly disappointed when the patient begins questioning the treatment. The Other's desire does not become transparent merely because the Other is an adult, a parent, or a therapist.
Recognition can consequently become an uncertain affair. We may feel understood by someone who has misunderstood us. We may feel dismissed by a person who is genuinely interested. A familiar expression can acquire a significance that neither person anticipated. The imago offers a way of organizing these encounters, but it does not exhaust them. There is always the possibility that the person before us is not quite the person we have imagined, and that we are not quite the person we have imagined ourselves to be for them.
II. What Passes Between Us
Projective Identification, Containment, and the Problem of Knowing
Much of what occurs in a relationship is difficult to describe. We notice a hesitation, an alteration in someone's voice, or a change in the atmosphere of a conversation. A person who had been speaking freely becomes guarded. Someone begins laughing while describing an experience that sounds painful. A therapist finds themselves unusually tired during a session, or unexpectedly interested in a detail that the patient considers unimportant. These experiences can become meaningful, although their meaning is rarely self-evident. A change in the clinician's feeling may have something to do with the patient, the relationship, an event earlier in the day, or a concern the clinician has brought into the room. The difficulty is not simply identifying what has occurred. It is deciding how much we can know about another person's experience through our own.
Klein's development of projective identification offers an influential account of the relationship between internal experience and the perception of another person. In her 1946 paper, she describes fantasies involving the splitting off and projection of aspects of the self into an object, particularly within her account of early object relations.4 The concept was subsequently developed by other analysts to consider the ways an interpersonal encounter may become organized around experiences that neither participant can readily articulate. A person may come to feel accused, helpless, controlling, or rejected within a relationship whose emotional organization remains difficult to understand. The temptation is to regard the feeling as evidence that the other person has somehow placed it there.
That temptation deserves attention. If I feel inadequate while listening to a patient, it may be that the patient is struggling with feelings of inadequacy that have become implicated in our relationship. It may also be that I have misunderstood something, that I am tired, or that the patient has questioned an interpretation I was particularly invested in making. The experience can become interesting without establishing its origin. Countertransference is not a privileged instrument that converts the analyst's feelings into knowledge of the patient's unconscious. It is part of an encounter in which the analyst's own history, expectations, identifications, and desires remain active.
Bion's account of the relationship between container and contained offers another way of considering experiences that have not yet become available for thought. In Learning from Experience, he develops an account of alpha-function and the transformation of emotional experience into elements that can participate in dreaming and thinking.5 His model invites us to consider how a relationship may provide conditions under which an experience becomes more available for thought. Yet the language of containment can become misleading when it suggests that the clinician possesses a stable capacity to understand feelings that the patient cannot bear. The analyst may sometimes help articulate an experience. At other times, the patient may be trying to communicate something the analyst has not yet understood.
Consider a patient who begins describing an argument with a colleague. The patient speaks rapidly, returning repeatedly to the colleague's tone and the unfairness of the accusation. The clinician notices an increasing sense of urgency and begins wondering whether the patient is trying to make them feel the anxiety of being accused. That may be an interesting hypothesis. But the patient may simply be angry and eager to describe what happened. The clinician's sense of urgency may arise from an assumption that the story ought to lead toward an emotional insight before the session ends. If the clinician intervenes too quickly, the patient may experience the interruption as another occasion when someone has failed to listen.
The problem becomes especially apparent when an analyst treats a countertransference response as though it were an interpretation already established. A clinician feels controlled and concludes that the patient is controlling. The patient disagrees, and the disagreement is understood as resistance. The clinician becomes more convinced, while the patient becomes increasingly frustrated. The encounter has acquired a circular quality in which the analyst's experience confirms the theory and the patient's objection confirms it again. Something that began as an attempt to understand an emotional relationship has become a way of making the patient's experience unavailable.
There are, of course, occasions when a patient recognizes something important in the clinician's description. A person who has struggled to find words for an experience may feel relieved when another person notices its emotional character. Someone may discover that they have been anticipating criticism and recognize how that expectation has entered the treatment. Another may begin considering how their anger affects the people around them. These moments can be valuable without establishing a general rule that the clinician's feelings reveal what the patient cannot acknowledge.
The distinction matters because people do not always experience themselves as they are experienced by others. A woman may describe herself as calm while her partner experiences her silence as threatening. A man may believe he is being helpful while his daughter experiences his advice as criticism. Neither account can be reduced to the other. The woman may genuinely feel calm, and the partner may genuinely feel threatened. The man may be trying to help, and his daughter may have good reasons for experiencing the advice as intrusive. The relationship becomes more interesting when these differences can be considered without requiring one person to surrender their experience to the other's interpretation.
The analytic relationship is no exception. A patient may feel understood when the clinician is uncertain about what has been communicated. They may feel exposed when the clinician has intended only to ask an ordinary question. A therapist may experience an intervention as gentle while the patient experiences it as humiliating. The difference can become part of the conversation, although it may also become a source of conflict. The analyst's willingness to reconsider an interpretation does not eliminate the asymmetry of the clinical relationship. The clinician continues to occupy a position of professional authority, and that authority affects how readily a patient can disagree.
We might consider how easily the language of empathy can obscure this difficulty. To say that we feel what another person feels can sound like an expression of unusual closeness. Yet it can also become a claim upon the other's experience. The patient may have spent much of their life accommodating people who insist that they know how the patient feels. A parent may have described the child's sadness as anger, or their reluctance as ingratitude. A spouse may have insisted that the other is jealous when they are frightened, or frightened when they are angry. In such circumstances, the experience of being understood may be entangled with the experience of being told what one is feeling.
There is no simple solution to the problem. We depend upon our impressions of others, and those impressions are frequently useful. A clinician who refuses to consider their own emotional responses may overlook something important in the encounter. A clinician who treats those responses as definitive may overlook the patient. The question concerns how an impression becomes available for conversation. It can be offered tentatively, questioned, revised, or left aside. The patient may recognize something in it, disagree with it, or introduce an association that changes the subject entirely. What passes between two people is not always something either can possess as knowledge.
III. The Feeling That Wasn't Mine
The Analyst's Desire and the Possibility of Misunderstanding
There is a particular discomfort in realizing that someone has been trying to make us feel something. The experience need not involve any deliberate manipulation. A friend tells a story and seems disappointed when we do not respond with the expected enthusiasm. A parent recalls a sacrifice and waits for an expression of gratitude. A spouse describes a painful event and becomes irritated when the other person remains calm. We may understand what the person is hoping for and still find that the feeling does not arrive. Or we may begin producing an expression that seems appropriate while wondering whether it belongs to us. These small encounters introduce a curious problem about the relationship between emotional experience and the desire of another person.
Psychotherapy can reproduce this difficulty in ways that are not immediately apparent. A clinician may offer an interpretation with considerable care and become convinced that it has touched something important. The patient pauses. The clinician notices the silence and wonders whether the patient has been moved. The patient may be considering the interpretation, feeling confused, or trying to decide how to disagree. If the therapist begins describing the silence as evidence of a profound emotional response, the patient may find themselves in an uncomfortable position. They can accept an experience they do not recognize or risk disappointing someone whose understanding has become important to them.
Consider a patient who has spent several sessions discussing a difficult relationship with a parent. The clinician notices a recurring theme of disappointment and offers an interpretation concerning the patient's longing for recognition. The interpretation is plausible and draws upon material the patient has described. Yet the patient does not experience the emotional recognition the clinician seems to anticipate. They understand the words, but the interpretation does not seem especially interesting. They may have been thinking about something quite different. The clinician, sensing that the intervention has not been received as intended, begins explaining it more carefully. The patient grows quiet. What began as an attempt to understand the patient's experience has become an encounter in which the patient feels increasingly responsible for producing the clinician's expected response.
The patient may eventually describe the difficulty. They did not feel particularly sad when the interpretation was offered, but they began feeling that they were supposed to be sad. They wondered whether the clinician would be disappointed if they failed to recognize the importance of what had been said. They may have agreed because disagreement seemed likely to prolong the conversation. Or they may have become angry without initially understanding why. The emotional difficulty now concerns not only the relationship with the parent but the experience of having another person describe a feeling the patient does not recognize as their own.
One response interests me in particular: "I want to know more about your experience of how I made you feel something that wasn't your feeling." The question does not assume that the clinician's interpretation was correct or that the patient's response was defensive. It introduces the possibility that the clinician has participated in producing an experience that deserves attention. The patient may describe feeling pressured, misunderstood, irritated, or uncertain. They may also discover that the interpretation touched something they had not initially recognized. Neither outcome is guaranteed. The conversation becomes interesting because the clinician's participation is no longer excluded from consideration.
Lacan's work on the analyst's desire offers a way of approaching this problem without reducing it to a question of good intentions. The analyst occupies a position within the treatment that can become invested with considerable significance. A patient may imagine that the clinician knows what is wrong, what the patient ought to want, or what kind of person the treatment is supposed to produce. The clinician may be drawn into this expectation, especially when an interpretation seems to confirm an established theory. Lacan's discussion of desire and the direction of the treatment complicates the assumption that the analyst's task is to guide the patient toward a particular form of adaptation or emotional understanding.6
There is an important distinction between the analyst's desire as a technical question and the analyst's ordinary wishes for the patient. A clinician may hope that someone who has been suffering will find relief. They may be pleased when a patient develops a relationship, returns to work, or begins enjoying activities that had become difficult. These responses are understandable. The difficulty arises when the clinician's hopes become an implicit measure of the patient's progress, particularly when the patient begins organizing their speech around the expectation of pleasing the therapist. The treatment may become another relationship in which the patient attempts to become somebody for another person.
The imago becomes involved in this process in several directions. The patient may encounter the clinician through an image of authority that has become familiar in earlier relationships. The clinician may become identified with an image of the helpful therapist, the perceptive interpreter, or the person who can finally understand what others have failed to recognize. These identifications can support the work, but they can also become difficult to question. A therapist who has become invested in being understood as empathic may struggle when a patient describes feeling misunderstood. A clinician who takes pride in being analytically perceptive may experience a patient's disagreement as evidence that the interpretation has reached something especially defended. The analyst's own imago has entered the encounter.
Freud's account of the ego ideal provides one way to consider the importance of these identifications, while Lacan's subsequent development of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real introduces distinctions that complicate the relationship between self-image, language, and what resists symbolization. We need not assign every clinical event to one of these registers. The distinctions become useful when they allow us to consider different dimensions of an encounter. The clinician may be invested in an image of themselves as understanding. Their professional position carries symbolic authority. And something in the patient's experience may remain unavailable to the interpretation being offered. These dimensions are related without becoming interchangeable.
There is also a social dimension to the problem of being felt. People learn how their emotions are expected to appear within families, schools, workplaces, religious communities, and other institutions. Grief may be recognized when it appears as sadness but questioned when it appears as relief. Anger may be welcomed as evidence of self-assertion in one setting and treated as disloyalty in another. A person may learn to describe themselves as resilient because vulnerability has become difficult to express within their community. These expectations are not simply private fantasies. They belong to the language and practices through which people become recognizable to one another.
A patient may enter treatment already familiar with these expectations. They may have been encouraged to name their feelings, identify their needs, and communicate them appropriately. Such language can be useful. It can also become another standard against which the patient measures themselves. They may begin wondering whether they are experiencing the right feeling, whether they have expressed it correctly, or whether their response demonstrates sufficient psychological awareness. The clinician can become implicated in these expectations without intending to reproduce them.
What becomes possible when a patient disagrees with the clinician's account of their experience? The disagreement may lead to a more interesting understanding of the original interpretation. It may reveal a misunderstanding that has been developing over several sessions. It may introduce a memory of another relationship in which the patient felt pressured to produce a particular response. Or it may remain a straightforward disagreement. The patient did not experience what the clinician imagined, and there is no need to make the difference more mysterious than it is.
We can return to the question with which the essay began. What does another person see when they look at us? The question acquires another form within psychotherapy: what does the clinician feel when they listen to me, and what am I expected to feel in return? The patient may become interested in the analyst's desire, just as the analyst becomes interested in the patient's. Their impressions can become part of the treatment, although neither person's experience provides an unquestionable account of the other.
The feeling of being felt is not always comforting. It may be pleasurable to discover that another person has noticed something we could not describe. It may be irritating to discover that they have mistaken us for someone we do not recognize. We can enjoy being understood and resent the certainty with which another person claims to understand us. The same encounter may contain affection, misunderstanding, curiosity, disappointment, and an unexpected moment of humor. There may be something more to say about any one of these experiences, or the conversation may take another direction.
The clinician's misunderstanding need not become a failure that must be overcome through a better interpretation. It can remain part of the relationship, available for further thought. The patient may discover something about how they have been recognized by others. The clinician may discover something about their own expectations. Or both may become interested in a detail that had seemed incidental to the disagreement.
To be felt by another person is not necessarily to be known by them. The distinction leaves room for something important: the possibility that another person's understanding can matter without becoming the final account of our experience. We may recognize ourselves in what they say, find ourselves strangely absent from it, or discover an unexpected association while trying to explain the difference.
And there may be more to the conversation than either person had imagined.
Notes
1. Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (1923), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 19, 3–66. Freud's account of identification and the ego ideal informs the discussion of recognition and the formation of the self.
2. Jacques Lacan, "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience" (1949), in Écrits, translated by Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006). The distinction between the ego's imaginary unity and the subject's division is developed through Lacan's subsequent teaching.
3. Jacques Lacan, "The Signification of the Phallus" (1958), in Écrits, and The Seminar, Book V: Formations of the Unconscious (1957–1958). These works develop the relationship between need, demand, and desire. The clinical examples in this essay are interpretive applications rather than illustrations drawn from Lacan's own cases.
4. Melanie Klein, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms" (1946), in Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963. The broader interpersonal understanding of projective identification developed through subsequent object-relations literature should be distinguished from Klein's original formulation.
5. W. R. Bion, Learning from Experience (London: Heinemann, 1962). Bion's concepts of alpha-function and container-contained provide a framework for considering the transformation of emotional experience into thought. They do not establish that the analyst's countertransference reliably identifies the patient's unconscious state.
6. Jacques Lacan, "The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power" (1958), in Écrits; see also The Seminar, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959–1960). The discussion of the clinician's expectations and the patient's pressure to demonstrate insight is an application of these technical and ethical concerns.
References
Bion, W. R. Learning from Experience. London: Heinemann, 1962.
Freud, Sigmund. The Ego and the Id. 1923. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 19. London: Hogarth Press, 1961.
Klein, Melanie. "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms." 1946. In Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963. London: Hogarth Press, 1975.
Klein, Melanie. "The Origins of Transference." 1952. In Envy and Gratitude and Other Works 1946–1963. London: Hogarth Press, 1975.
Lacan, Jacques. "The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience." 1949. In Écrits, translated by Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006.
Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar, Book III: The Psychoses. 1955–1956. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated by Russell Grigg. New York: W. W. Norton, 1993.
Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar, Book V: Formations of the Unconscious. 1957–1958. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller.
Lacan, Jacques. "The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of Its Power." 1958. In Écrits, translated by Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006.
Lacan, Jacques. "The Signification of the Phallus." 1958. In Écrits, translated by Bruce Fink. New York: W. W. Norton, 2006.
Books on This Subject
Learning from Experience
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Melanie Klein Today: Developments in Theory and Practice, Volume 1: Mainly Theory
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