Lost Stories / Psychoanalytic Essays
The Trouble with Getting Better
Repetition, Jouissance, and the Problem of Adaptation
I. The Pleasure of Finding the Wound
Repetition, Recognition, and the Satisfaction of Explanation
There is a peculiar satisfaction in discovering why we are the way we are. A familiar difficulty acquires a history. The relationship that repeatedly disappoints us begins to resemble an earlier relationship. An argument with a spouse recalls an argument with a parent. A disappointment at work brings to mind an experience from childhood that had seemed unrelated. What had appeared to be an isolated frustration becomes part of a larger arrangement, and the discovery can be deeply compelling. We have found something that makes sense of our experience. We may even begin to enjoy the process of finding it.
Psychoanalysis has always been interested in the relationship between present experience and what has come before. Freud's early clinical work developed through the discovery that symptoms could be connected with memories, fantasies, conflicts, and wishes that were not readily available to consciousness. Yet his subsequent work complicated any straightforward account in which the recovery of a forgotten experience resolves the symptom. In "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through," Freud describes how a patient may repeat something in the analytic relationship rather than remember it as an event belonging to the past.1 Repetition is not simply a failure to recall. It becomes one of the ways the past participates in the present.
The distinction is especially interesting because remembering and repeating are not always easily separated. A person may remember an event with considerable clarity and continue finding themselves in situations that resemble it. They may understand the relationship between an early experience and a current difficulty without finding that the understanding changes what happens next. A patient may know that they anticipate criticism because criticism was common in their family. They may recognize the expectation in their marriage, their friendships, and their work. Yet the next ambiguous remark still arrives as criticism. The explanation is meaningful, but it does not necessarily alter the experience.
There are also occasions when the explanation itself becomes part of the repetition. A patient describes a difficult encounter and quickly identifies its connection to childhood. They have become adept at recognizing the pattern. They know how to describe the original wound, how it appears in present relationships, and what they imagine they ought to do differently. Their account may be thoughtful and accurate. Still, something remains unsettled. They may become increasingly interested in finding additional examples of the same pattern, as though each new discovery confirms something important about who they are.
This is not necessarily an obstacle to treatment. People have good reasons to value explanations that make their experience intelligible. Someone who has spent years feeling confused about their reactions may find considerable relief in recognizing a recurring pattern. The discovery may introduce compassion where there had been self-reproach, or anger where there had been resignation. It may also open a conversation that had previously been difficult to begin. The question becomes more complicated when the explanation grows so familiar that it begins organizing every new experience before the experience has had an opportunity to become interesting in its own right.
Consider a person who has come to understand their difficulties through the language of abandonment. They recognize how an early loss has affected their relationships. They notice anxiety when a partner is unavailable and disappointment when friends fail to respond. These connections may be important. Yet a missed telephone call can also be an ordinary missed telephone call. A friend may have been busy, distracted, irritated, or interested in something else. The language of abandonment may illuminate one dimension of the experience while leaving other possibilities unexplored. The person can know something about the history of their reaction without knowing everything about the encounter that occasioned it.
There is another person involved in this process: the analyst. The clinician may also enjoy finding the wound. A connection between a patient's present difficulty and an earlier relationship can feel like a particularly successful interpretation. The patient may become emotional, remember something unexpected, or express gratitude for having been understood. These moments can be important to both participants. They can also become occasions when the analyst begins anticipating a particular kind of discovery. The clinician may listen for the childhood experience that will explain the present conflict, while the patient becomes increasingly skilled at supplying it.
The difficulty is not that the discovery is false. An interpretation can be persuasive and still become restrictive. A patient may begin feeling that every disappointment must lead backward to the same relationship. An analyst may become less interested in details that do not fit the established account. A new association may be treated as a variation of something already known. The treatment continues producing explanations, but the explanations begin to resemble one another. The patient has acquired a sophisticated account of their suffering and may find themselves repeating that account as faithfully as they repeat the experiences it describes.
Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle introduces a more troubling question about repetition. He considers experiences that do not appear to be organized around the straightforward pursuit of pleasure, including traumatic dreams and the repetition of painful situations.2 His subsequent speculation concerning the death drive remains controversial, but the clinical problem that occasions it has continued to matter: why do people return to experiences that cause them distress? The question does not require us to assume that suffering is secretly pleasurable. It invites consideration of forms of satisfaction that cannot be reduced to conscious enjoyment.
We can distinguish the pleasure of an explanation from the satisfaction involved in a repetition. Someone may enjoy understanding their difficulties while finding no enjoyment in the difficulties themselves. Another person may feel strangely attached to a familiar conflict, even while sincerely wishing it would end. A patient may become distressed when a relationship improves because the improvement unsettles an expectation that has organized much of their emotional life. These experiences do not necessarily share a single cause. Their significance emerges through the particular ways they become involved in a person's history and present relationships.
There may also be satisfaction in being the person who has been wounded. This does not mean that the wound was desired or that the suffering is exaggerated. An experience of injury can become involved in a person's understanding of themselves, their relationships, and the recognition they expect from others. The person who was never appreciated may organize much of their life around demonstrating how much they have accomplished. The person who was betrayed may become unusually attentive to signs of disloyalty. The person who was neglected may become devoted to caring for others and resentful when their devotion is not acknowledged. These identifications can be painful, productive, generous, and limiting in different ways.
It becomes possible to ask what happens when the wound no longer provides the same explanation. A person who has spent years describing themselves as abandoned may enter a relationship in which someone remains consistently available. They may enjoy the relationship and still feel uneasy. They may find themselves questioning the other person's motives, anticipating a departure, or becoming irritated by the very availability they had long desired. The familiar account of abandonment has not become irrelevant. Something new has entered the relationship, and the old explanation may not yet provide a way of thinking about it.
There is no need to turn this uneasiness into a demand for further insight. The person may need time to become accustomed to a different experience. They may discover that they have other wishes that were difficult to recognize while the relationship was organized around anticipated loss. They may become bored, affectionate, frightened, or unexpectedly playful. The change can introduce difficulties of its own. Getting better may involve more than understanding what has been painful. It may also involve discovering what becomes possible when the familiar explanation no longer occupies the center of the conversation.
II. The Things We Cannot Give Up
Jouissance, the Imago, and the Attachment to What Hurts
We are often attached to things that make our lives difficult. A person may complain about the demands of their work while becoming restless during a holiday. Someone may resent being needed by their family and feel strangely unnecessary when others begin managing without them. A couple may describe a recurring argument as exhausting and discover that its absence leaves an unfamiliar silence. These attachments can be difficult to understand because they do not fit neatly within a distinction between what feels good and what feels bad. The experience may be unpleasant, yet something about it remains compelling.
Lacan's concept of jouissance offers one way of considering this difficulty. The term does not simply mean pleasure, nor does it identify an enjoyment that a person consciously recognizes. Its significance develops through Lacan's account of desire, the body, prohibition, and the limits of the pleasure principle. In The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, Lacan explores the relationship between desire and forms of satisfaction that complicate the pursuit of an ordinary good.3 His later work continues developing the problem through repetition, discourse, and the ways satisfaction becomes implicated in the subject's relation to language.
It would be misleading to conclude that people enjoy their suffering. A person living with chronic anxiety may desperately wish to feel less anxious. Someone caught in a destructive relationship may sincerely want to leave. A patient whose symptoms have narrowed their life may have good reasons to seek relief. The language of jouissance becomes useful when it allows us to consider why a familiar arrangement may persist despite the person's conscious wishes. It becomes less useful when it turns every difficulty into evidence that the person secretly wants to remain unhappy.
Consider a man who has spent much of his life being the dependable person in his family. He manages emergencies, organizes practical arrangements, and becomes the person others contact when something goes wrong. He is exhausted by the responsibility and complains that nobody appreciates what he does. Eventually, family circumstances change. His siblings become more independent, and his parents no longer require the same assistance. He has more time, fewer obligations, and greater freedom to pursue his own interests. Yet he finds himself increasingly irritated. He notices small mistakes in the way others manage their affairs. He offers advice that nobody has requested. He begins feeling excluded from decisions that once depended upon him.
His frustration may involve many things. He may miss the closeness that accompanied his responsibilities. He may feel disappointed that his family has not expressed more gratitude. He may have little experience organizing his time around his own interests. He may also have become identified with an image of himself as the person who is needed. The role that exhausted him also provided a recognizable place within the family. Its disappearance introduces a question that had remained difficult to ask while he was occupied with everyone else's concerns: who is he when nobody requires his help?
The imago becomes important because identification is not merely an opinion we hold about ourselves. It can organize the ways we seek recognition, interpret relationships, and anticipate the responses of others. A person who has become identified with being indispensable may experience another person's independence as rejection. Someone who has organized their life around being misunderstood may find an unexpectedly sympathetic listener unsettling. A person who takes pride in enduring hardship may have difficulty recognizing the possibility of refusing an unnecessary demand. These identifications are not simply errors to be corrected. They have histories, and they may have made important forms of living possible.
There is an intimate relationship between identification and the expectations we attribute to others. The person who has always been responsible may imagine that everyone expects them to continue. Sometimes the expectation is real. Families, workplaces, and communities can become accustomed to someone's willingness to absorb burdens that others would rather avoid. At other times, the person may continue responding to demands that are no longer being made. The distinction is not always obvious, particularly when the person has spent years participating in relationships organized around the familiar role.
Lacan's term extimacy offers another way to approach this peculiar relationship between what feels most intimate and what is encountered as foreign. Something that appears to belong to the person's most private experience may be organized through the language, expectations, and identifications of others. Conversely, something encountered as alien or disturbing may be closely implicated in the person's own desire. The point is not that the individual lacks an inner life. It is that the distinction between an interior self and an exterior social world becomes more complicated when we consider how a person comes to recognize themselves.
The question of getting better can therefore introduce an unexpected difficulty. A symptom may become less intense, a relationship may improve, or a familiar conflict may begin losing its importance. These changes can be welcome. They may also unsettle an identification that had provided continuity across many years. Someone who has spent much of their life trying to prove that they are worthy of love may find it difficult to receive affection that does not require a demonstration. Someone who has organized their ambitions around the desire to impress a parent may discover that achievement has become less satisfying after the parent's death. The person has not necessarily lost their capacity for pleasure. The terms through which pleasure had become meaningful may be changing.
Analytic treatment can become implicated in these attachments. A patient may develop an increasingly elaborate account of their symptoms and become attached to being the person who understands them. The clinician may take pride in the patient's sophistication and begin treating the ability to describe unconscious conflict as evidence of progress. The patient becomes better at speaking analytically while continuing to experience the same difficulties outside the consulting room. This does not mean that the work has accomplished nothing. The capacity to think about one's experience can be valuable in itself. It does invite another question: what is happening to the patient's life as the account of that life becomes more refined?
There is also the possibility that the patient begins improving in ways the analyst does not immediately recognize. A person may become less interested in exploring a familiar conflict and more interested in ordinary activities. They may begin spending time with friends, pursuing a new relationship, or enjoying a hobby that has little obvious connection to the material previously discussed in treatment. The clinician may wonder whether the patient is avoiding something important. That may be worth considering. It may also be that the patient has become interested in something other than the symptom that once occupied so much of their attention.
The analyst's desire becomes consequential at precisely this point. If the clinician is invested in a particular account of progress, the patient's changing interests may be experienced as a departure from the work. A patient who no longer wishes to revisit a familiar wound may seem resistant to further exploration. Someone who begins questioning the usefulness of treatment may appear to be defending against an important interpretation. These possibilities cannot be excluded, but neither can they be assumed. The clinician's disappointment may have something to do with the patient's difficulties, and it may also have something to do with the clinician's attachment to the work as it has been understood.
What does a person give up when they begin feeling better? Sometimes very little. A symptom diminishes, and the person enjoys the relief. At other times, a familiar way of organizing experience begins to lose its importance. The person may feel less certain about who they are, what they want, or how they belong within relationships that had previously seemed settled. Improvement can introduce uncertainty without becoming a problem in itself. There may be a period in which the old arrangement no longer feels necessary and the new possibilities have not yet become familiar.
The things we cannot give up are not always things we consciously value. We may be attached to an expectation, an argument, a role, or an image of ourselves that has become inseparable from our experience of being somebody. The attachment may loosen through interpretation, through a change in circumstances, through another relationship, or through an event that has little to do with psychotherapy. It may also remain important. There is no reason to assume that every identification must be relinquished or that freedom consists in having none.
The more interesting question concerns what becomes possible when an attachment can be considered rather than simply repeated. A person may continue caring for their family without needing to be indispensable. They may remain ambitious without organizing every achievement around a parent's approval. They may recognize the importance of an old wound without requiring every new experience to confirm it. These changes are not guaranteed outcomes of analysis. They are among the possibilities that can emerge when a familiar arrangement becomes available for further thought.
III. The Stranger Within
Productive Maladaptation and the Possibility of Another Life
Getting better is often described as becoming better adapted. A person learns to manage their emotions, maintain relationships, fulfill responsibilities, and participate more successfully in the ordinary demands of life. These capacities can be important. Someone whose anxiety has made it difficult to leave home may welcome the freedom to travel. A person whose depression has interrupted their work may be relieved to return. Someone who has struggled to maintain friendships may enjoy discovering that relationships can become less exhausting. Adaptation can describe genuine changes in the possibilities available to a person.
Yet the language of adaptation introduces a question that is not always asked: adapted to what? A person may become increasingly capable of meeting expectations that have never been especially good for them. Someone may learn to tolerate an exhausting workplace, accommodate a demanding family, or remain agreeable within a relationship that leaves little room for disagreement. These achievements can be described as improvements in functioning. They may also involve the person becoming more proficient at enduring circumstances they have had little opportunity to question.
Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents approaches the relationship between individual satisfaction and social life through the conflicts involved in civilization's demands upon instinctual life.4 His account does not offer a simple opposition between the authentic individual and an oppressive society. Social life makes important forms of cooperation, affection, and security possible, even as it introduces prohibitions and renunciations that can become sources of suffering. The individual does not stand outside civilization as a fully formed self waiting to be liberated from its demands. The very terms through which a person understands their wishes have developed within relationships and institutions.
Erich Fromm's The Sane Society raises a related problem from the perspective of social criticism. A society may regard particular forms of adjustment as normal even when those forms of living contribute to alienation or diminish the possibilities for human flourishing.5 Herbert Marcuse, in Eros and Civilization and One-Dimensional Man, develops a different but related critique of the relationship between social organization, repression, and the production of needs.6 Their approaches differ considerably, but both complicate the assumption that successful participation in established social arrangements is sufficient evidence of psychological well-being.
These questions become interesting within psychotherapy because the clinician and patient are already participants in the social world whose expectations they may be trying to understand. A therapist may encourage a patient to establish boundaries while assuming that the patient should continue performing the same responsibilities. A patient may seek treatment because they have become unable to tolerate a workplace that others regard as ordinary. The clinician may understand the difficulty primarily through the patient's anxiety, perfectionism, or sensitivity to criticism. These considerations may be relevant. The workplace may also be unreasonable, the responsibilities excessive, or the patient's dissatisfaction an intelligible response to the conditions under which they are living.
Consider a woman who has spent years accommodating the expectations of her family. She is described as generous, patient, and unusually understanding. Relatives contact her when they are upset, and she rearranges her schedule to help. She rarely complains, although she has begun feeling increasingly resentful. She enters treatment hoping to become less irritable and more capable of managing the demands placed upon her. As she begins talking, she becomes interested in how little room she has allowed herself to refuse requests. She remembers occasions when she wanted to say no and agreed instead. She also recalls moments when she enjoyed being regarded as the person everyone could depend upon.
Several possibilities become available. She may learn to manage her responsibilities without feeling so overwhelmed. She may discover ways of asking other family members to participate. She may become more willing to disappoint people. She may also begin questioning why she has regarded the preservation of family harmony as her responsibility in the first place. These developments are related, but they are not identical. The first may allow her to continue performing the familiar role more comfortably. The others may introduce changes in the relationships themselves.
Her family may not welcome those changes. Someone who has always been available can become difficult to recognize when they begin declining requests. Relatives may describe the change as selfishness, withdrawal, or evidence that therapy has made her less caring. She may experience guilt and wonder whether she has become unreasonable. The clinician may be tempted to reassure her that the new behavior is healthy. Yet the situation may be more complicated than a distinction between healthy boundaries and unhealthy expectations. She may genuinely care about the people who depend upon her. She may regret some of the ways she has expressed her frustration. She may also be discovering desires that have had little room within the familiar arrangement.
I have been interested in describing one possibility within these encounters as productive maladaptation. The phrase is not intended as a new diagnosis or an ideal toward which treatment should move. It names a possibility that becomes visible when the capacity to question an arrangement is more important than the ability to fit comfortably within it. A person may become less adapted to a familiar expectation while becoming more capable of thinking about whether they wish to continue participating in it. What appears as a decline in compliance may accompany an increase in the possibilities available to them.
The term requires some care. Maladaptation can describe genuine suffering, impaired functioning, or circumstances in which a person needs substantial assistance. There is nothing inherently productive about distress, withdrawal, or an inability to participate in ordinary life. Nor is resistance to social expectations automatically evidence of freedom. A person can reject a demand for reasons that are thoughtful, impulsive, defensive, or difficult to understand. The interest of productive maladaptation lies elsewhere. It concerns the possibility that adjustment is not always the most useful measure of what has become possible for a person.
We can imagine a patient who has become increasingly capable of tolerating a humiliating relationship. They have learned to regulate their reactions, avoid arguments, and maintain an appearance of composure. These capacities may be useful, especially when the person has limited alternatives. Yet the treatment may become more interesting when the patient begins wondering why remaining composed has become the principal objective. They may discover anger that had been difficult to express. They may begin considering whether the relationship can change. They may decide to remain, leave, confront the other person, or pursue some arrangement that had not previously occurred to them. The value of the work cannot be established simply by identifying which choice appears most independent.
Productive maladaptation also complicates the analyst's relationship to the patient's suffering. The clinician may be pleased when symptoms diminish and concerned when the patient begins making decisions that introduce conflict. These responses are understandable. Yet a life that becomes more available for thought does not necessarily become immediately easier to live. A person who begins questioning a familiar identification may experience uncertainty. Someone who becomes more willing to disagree may encounter disappointment from others. A patient who discovers an interest that has been neglected for years may find that pursuing it requires changes they had not anticipated.
There is no reason to romanticize these difficulties. The person may need practical support, financial security, medical care, or assistance with circumstances that cannot be altered through interpretation. A clinician's interest in the meaning of a symptom should not become indifference to the conditions under which the patient is living. Nor should the possibility of social criticism become an excuse to overlook the ways a person's own conflicts participate in their difficulties. Both the social arrangement and the person's relationship to it can become subjects of inquiry.
The stranger within is not necessarily a hidden authentic self waiting to emerge once the demands of others have been removed. That image can reproduce the very problem it attempts to solve. It imagines that somewhere beneath our identifications there is a person whose desires have remained untouched by the relationships through which they developed. Psychoanalysis offers a more complicated account. We become recognizable to ourselves through language, relationships, fantasies, and identifications that are never entirely our own. The experience of discovering something unfamiliar within ourselves need not reveal a more original identity. It may introduce another way of relating to what has already become familiar.
A person may discover that they are not as generous as they imagined, and that they continue to care deeply about others. They may recognize envy in a relationship they had understood entirely through admiration. They may become interested in a wish that seems inconsistent with the life they have built. These discoveries do not necessarily require a dramatic change. Someone may continue living much as before while experiencing greater freedom to think about their choices. Another may find that a small alteration has consequences that extend far beyond what they anticipated.
The relationship between analysis and adaptation therefore remains unsettled. There are circumstances in which adaptation is necessary and welcome. There are others in which the capacity to question what has been expected becomes an important development. A patient may need relief from a symptom, an opportunity to understand a repetition, or simply a place where an experience can be described without being immediately organized around an established explanation. These possibilities need not be arranged into a hierarchy of more and less sophisticated therapeutic achievements.
We can return to the pleasure of finding the wound. The discovery of a familiar pattern may help a person understand something important about their life. It may also become a story that organizes subsequent experience too completely. The language of jouissance can illuminate attachments that remain compelling despite their painful consequences, while becoming unhelpful when it is used to explain away a person's wish for relief. The critique of adaptation can open questions about the conditions under which people live, while becoming another demand if the patient is expected to resist every established arrangement.
Each of these ideas has something to offer, and each can become restrictive when it begins determining what the patient ought to discover. The analyst may become attached to the interpretation that reveals repetition, the theory that identifies jouissance, or the social critique that promises liberation. The patient may find something valuable in any of these accounts. They may also have another thought, another memory, or another way of describing what has been happening.
Getting better can mean feeling less pain. It can mean becoming more capable of participating in relationships and activities that matter. It can involve recognizing a familiar repetition, questioning an identification, or discovering that an expectation once experienced as necessary has become negotiable. It can also be an ordinary improvement that does not require a profound explanation. The person sleeps better, enjoys a conversation, becomes less frightened, or finds that something which once occupied every afternoon has begun to matter less.
There may be relief in no longer needing to understand every difficulty through the same wound. There may be pleasure in discovering that an old argument has become uninteresting. A person may find themselves doing something they had not expected, or wanting something they cannot yet explain. They may become less certain about the story they have told about themselves and more curious about what else there is to say.
And sometimes the trouble with getting better is that it leaves us with a life that has not yet been fully imagined.
Notes
1. Sigmund Freud, "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through" (1914), in The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 12, 145–156. Freud distinguishes remembering from repetition in the analytic relationship and develops the significance of working-through. The discussion of the analyst's enjoyment of explanatory discovery is a further clinical reflection rather than a claim drawn directly from this paper.
2. Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), in Standard Edition, vol. 18, 7–64. Freud's treatment of traumatic dreams, repetition, and the limits of the pleasure principle informs the discussion. The death-drive hypothesis should be distinguished from the more general clinical observation that painful experiences can recur.
3. Jacques Lacan, The Seminar, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959–1960), edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Dennis Porter (New York: W. W. Norton, 1992). See also The Seminar, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis (1969–1970), translated by Russell Grigg (New York: W. W. Norton, 2007). Lacan's development of jouissance extends beyond a simple opposition between pleasure and pain.
4. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (1930), in Standard Edition, vol. 21, 57–145. Freud's discussion of instinctual renunciation, aggression, and the demands of civilization informs the question of adaptation without establishing a simple opposition between individual freedom and social life.
5. Erich Fromm, The Sane Society (New York: Rinehart, 1955). Fromm's critique of social normality and alienation provides a distinct perspective on the relationship between adjustment and psychological well-being.
6. Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955); One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964). Marcuse's critique of repression, social organization, and the production of needs informs the discussion of adaptation. The phrase "productive maladaptation" is used here as the author's own conceptual proposal rather than a term attributed to Marcuse or Fromm.
References
Freud, Sigmund. "The Dynamics of Transference." 1912. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 12. London: Hogarth Press, 1958.
Freud, Sigmund. "Remembering, Repeating and Working-Through." 1914. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 12. London: Hogarth Press, 1958.
Freud, Sigmund. Beyond the Pleasure Principle. 1920. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 18. London: Hogarth Press, 1955.
Freud, Sigmund. Civilization and Its Discontents. 1930. In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 21. London: Hogarth Press, 1961.
Fromm, Erich. The Sane Society. New York: Rinehart, 1955.
Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959–1960. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated by Dennis Porter. New York: W. W. Norton, 1992.
Lacan, Jacques. The Seminar, Book XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, 1969–1970. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller. Translated by Russell Grigg. New York: W. W. Norton, 2007.
Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. Boston: Beacon Press, 1955.
Marcuse, Herbert. One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.
Books on This Subject
Civilization and Its Discontents
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The Seminar, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis
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